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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The first two chapters of this dissertation are closely related and pertain to small 
business reactions to income tax changes. The final chapter investigates the value 
consumers place on residential community associations.  
Small businesses file taxes in accordance with the personal income tax code 
because they are considered flow-through entities. Thus, personal income tax reforms 
directly affect the incentives small business owners face regarding employment and 
operations. I use the changes in personal income-tax rates during the 1993 and 2001-2003 
reforms and micro-level data to estimate the effect of statutory tax-rate changes on small-
business employment decisions.  I add two contributions to the current literature: first, I 
allow for intertemporal tax planning and secondly, I allow the firm's decision to employ 
labor to be correlated with the firm's salary expense decision. Estimation of a Heckman 
selection model for salary expenses shows that the probability that a business will employ 
labor is 1.18% higher when current tax rates increase by one percentage point and 0.70% 
lower when future rates are expected to increase by one percentage point. Among firms 
that already employ labor, the median salary expense elasticity with respect to current tax 
rates is -0.64. These estimates are larger than those reported in previous research because 
my model includes future taxes and allows for correlation between the firm‟s 
employment and salary decisions. Omitting the intertemporal tax responses biases the 
estimates of previous researchers upwards, whereas assuming the two firm decisions are 
independent biases estimates towards zero.   
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After examining the employment responses of small businesses to income tax 
changes, I then estimate the marginal welfare cost associated with the behavioral 
changes. The marginal welfare cost of an increase in income tax rates affects small 
businesses in many ways. I examine one aspect of the cost of a tax increase on small 
business employers: the marginal welfare cost of reduced owner-effort exerted in the 
firm. The welfare cost of reduced owner-effort and the corresponding reduction in 
reported taxable business income can be estimated using the elasticity of taxable business 
income. The elasticity of taxable business income measures the long-run annual 
incremental cost of a permanent income tax increase, relative to the prior income tax 
regime. The permanent welfare cost of personal income tax increases on small business 
employers is $920 million for the 1993 tax reforms and $245 million for the 2001-2003 
tax reforms. When small business employers supply less effort, they demand fewer 
productive inputs, including outside labor. Any outside labor displaced by the small 
business sector must transition to re-employment in the rest of the economy. The cost of 
displaced labor is in addition to the costs associated with the elasticity of taxable business 
income and is a one-time cost. I estimate the short-run cost of displaced labor to be $10 
million for the 1993 reforms and $3.2 million for the 2001-2003 reforms. This cost is a 
one-time reduction in welfare from labor displacement when workers are not instantly 
absorbed by the rest of the economy.  
Finally, in the third chapter, I examine sales price data on Spartanburg County 
homes both in and out of residential community associations to analyze the value of 
residential community associations. Comparable neighborhoods not in RCAs are 
iv 
 
included to estimate the value consumers place on RCA affiliation. RCAs appear to 
increase property values by 2.2% in the sample. I then examine one neighborhood with 
120 houses that has a mandatory homeowners‟ association for 30 lakefront properties. 
Homes in this particular RCA sell at a 3.8% premium to the other homes in the 
neighborhood. This is the capitalized net benefit of living on, and accessing the lake. I 
also examine the existing empirical literature on the efficiency of residential community 
associations and discuss the theoretical problems of analyzing RCA efficiency. My 
analysis shows that the existing empirical research on the efficiency of RCAs lacks 
identification and suffers from omitted variable bias. Including a variable for “property 
age” drastically changes the estimates and interpretations from the existing literature. Age 
is an important variable to include because it proxies for a host of factors like location, 
architectural-style, and projected maintenance costs, all of which influence property 
values. Omitting age downwardly biases the estimates. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES ON THE EMPLOYMENT 
DECISIONS OF SMALL BUSINESSES 
 
Introduction 
Small businesses are considered “flow-through” entities for income tax purposes. 
The business owner‟s wage income and business profits are taxed at the same marginal 
rate. Business owners can use their own labor solely or in conjunction with outside labor, 
a tax-deductible business expense, in the operations of the firm. Changes in tax rates 
affect the firm in two distinct ways: by altering the returns of the entire business entity 
and by inducing relative price changes in the production mix between outside labor and 
the owner‟s labor. When tax rates increase, the returns to the business decrease and 
production and labor demand decline through the scale effect. However, the price of 
outside labor falls relative to owner labor, so that if the owner‟s effort can be replaced by 
employed labor, the substitution effect may lead small firms to employ more outside 
labor. 
Small businesses constitute a large portion of the U.S. economy. Roughly 7.5% of 
all workers, or 10.3 million people, were self-employed in 2003, and an additional 4.9 
million people owned an incorporated business while reporting wages from another job 
(Hipple 2004). Small businesses account for a vast percentage of new job creation. Birch 
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(1987) estimates that firms with fewer than 20 employees accounted for 82% of new job 
creation between 1981 and 1985.
1
 
The effect of personal marginal income-tax rates on the employment decisions of 
small businesses is a relatively unexplored topic, yet small businesses account for 94% of 
all businesses filing with the IRS.
2
 I examine changes in the employment and wage bill 
decisions of small businesses in response to changes in current and future tax rates when 
selection on unobservables is assumed to occur among employers.  
I seek to identify the two distinct effects of changes in current and future tax rates 
on the probability of employing labor and total wage bills due to the relative change in 
the price of owner effort. The probability of employing labor and total wage bills are not 
independent decision processes; therefore, a Heckman selection model is specified for 
pooled cross-sections from the NBER Public Use File on individual income-tax returns 
from 1992-2005 for sole proprietors filing a Schedule C.  
The Heckman two-step model allows for the presence of a limited dependent 
variable (employers) and correlated processes for choosing to employ and then wage bill 
choice. The first step of the Heckman addresses the decision to employ outside labor. I 
estimate that a one percentage-point increase in current tax rates increases the probability 
of employing outside labor by 1.18 percent, while a one percentage-point increase in the 
                                               
1
 Large estimates for gross job creation by small firms are also reported by Davis et al.  (1996), as are high 
layoffs. Neumark et al. (2008) report small firms create more jobs than larger establishments but not to the 
extent of the Birch (1987) findings.  
2 C-corporations accounted for 6.6% of all IRS business filers in 2005, while sole proprietors accounted for 
72%. The remaining 21% are mainly S-corporations and a few partnerships. 
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marginal tax rate next year decreases the probability of employing labor today by 0.70 
percent.  
The second step of the model comprises a regression that accounts for selection 
on unobservables by firms employing labor, and estimates the wage bill elasticity with 
respect to current and future tax rate changes. The mean and median wage bill elasticities 
with respect to current tax rates are -0.17 and -0.64, respectively. Increases in future tax 
rates make production today more attractive relative to production tomorrow, indicating 
that firms anticipating higher future taxes shift production intertemporally. 
 
2 Income Tax Background 
In 1992, Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton campaigned on a promise to raise 
taxes on the wealthiest Americans. In the aftermath of the election, the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA-93) was signed into law. OBRA-93 increased 
personal income-taxes on Americans reporting adjusted gross incomes in excess of 
$140,000.
3
 Married taxpayers filing jointly with AGI greater than $250,000 faced 
marginal tax rates of 39.6% instead of 31%. Those with AGI greater than $140,000 but 
less than $250,000 faced a marginal tax rate of 36% instead of the previous 31%. 
Most tax reforms, like the 1993 reforms, are announced months or years in 
advance.
4
 With rational expectations or perfect foresight, future taxes are known with 
certainty and any deviations are random noise. Under the rational expectations theory, 
                                               
3 OBRA-93 also repealed the cap on Medicare taxes, increased the taxable portion of social security 
benefits, limited itemized deductions, increased Federal fuel taxes and expanded the Earned Income-tax 
Credit (EITC). 
4 The 1993 tax hikes were most likely anticipated in 1992 because the Clinton campaign focused on 
increasing taxes on the top 1% of taxpayers (defined as AGI greater than $139,999). 
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deviations from the equilibrium path would be random and only occur when tax-payers 
are “surprised” by relatively higher or lower tax rates than expected.  
Whereas OBRA-93 increased tax rates, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) lowered personal income-tax rates for most 
taxpayers. Tax-rate decreases were anticipated to phase in gradually through 2006. Rates 
initially decreased to 39.1% from 39.6% for the top tax-bracket and were scheduled to 
decline gradually to 35% over five years.
5
 In May 2003, in an attempt to stave off 
recession, Congress passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 
(JGTRRA). JGTRRA accelerated the tax decreases previously scheduled for 2006, 
making them effective immediately.
6
  
Calculating the appropriate effective tax rate is not a straight forward process for 
business owners. The NBER‟s TAXIM model is useful for analysis on an individual‟s 
taxable income but does not adjust for any line-items found on the business schedules 
(Schedule C, Schedule E, Schedule F). Ideally, I would like the business owner‟s 
marginal tax rate without his wage bill and other business expenses which is not possible. 
The correct tax rate for decision-making depends on the particular issue under 
consideration: marginal tax rates, average tax rates or statutory tax rates could be the 
most relevant rate for behavioral changes. A part-time business owner working full-time 
for another firm may be most sensitive to marginal tax rates. Any additional income 
earned by the part-time business would be taxed at the marginal rate. Marginal rates are 
                                               
5 See Figures 1 and 2 for comparison of anticipated and actual tax rates. 
6 See Table 1 for all relevant marginal tax rate changes. With knowledge of future tax changes, taxpayer 
and employers can plan in advance to take advantage or avoid any tax changes. 
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also very difficult to estimate and can suffer from endogeneity
7
. The average tax rate may 
be more important to full-time owners: they receive wage and profit income from the 
business; when planning for taxes they examine their total tax liability and potential 
deductions.  
The statutory tax rate may be appropriate when deciding how many businesses to 
operate or expanding existing operations
8
. The statutory tax rate is not likely to be 
endogenous because the majority of people do not bunch at tax bracket kink points.
9
 
Statutory rates offer transparency in most cases; it is relevant for either of the two prior 
scenarios because it determines the tax liability independent of behavioral adaptations.
10
  
Using similar methodologies but studying different tax reforms, Carroll et al. 
(2000a) and LaLumia (2008) find conflicting coefficients for the contemporaneous 
employment and gross receipts responses of business owners to current tax-rate changes. 
My novel theoretical framework reconciles the conflicting estimates obtained by previous 
researchers. The theoretical models in the previous research predict negative labor-
demand and wage bill coefficients for tax-rate increases. My model shows this is only the 
case for larger firms; small firms may actually employ more labor when tax rates 
increase.  
                                               
7
 Marginal tax rate calculations are estimates that try to account for statutory and implicit tax rates as well 
as personal and itemized deductions and credits that arise from special features of the tax code. 
8 Statutory tax rates are the tax rates listed for each income-bracket in a given year by the Internal Revenue 
Service. For example, a taxpayer with the median taxable income of $90,443 in 2005 would be taxed at 
three different rates: the first $14,000 would be taxed at 10%, the next $42,800 would be taxed at 15% and 
anything in excess of $56,800 would be taxed at 25%. 
9
 Bunching at kink points would indicate strong behavioral responses to bracket ranges; however, such 
behavior is not observed. See Saez (2009) for detailed analysis. 
10 Statutory rates may be the first indicator to businesses that marginal adjustments are necessary going 
forward.  
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Carroll et al. (2000a) and LaLumia (2008) implicitly assume the decisions to 
employ labor and the amount of labor are independent. LaLumia (2008) does not find 
evidence of increased employment probabilities or higher gross receipts, whereas Carroll 
et al. (2000a) do find such evidence.  
LaLumia (2008) investigates changes in gross business receipts and in the 
probability of hiring labor before and after the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001. She constructs a five-year panel beginning in 1999 and 
instruments for the tax decrease by applying post-reform tax rates to pre-reform reported 
income. While most tax reforms take place immediately, the 2001 tax reforms were 
intended to phase in through 2006 with small yearly decreases. When explaining the 
difference in her results and those by Carroll et al., LaLumia (2008) notes “the 2001 cuts 
were…more equally distributed across the income distribution (than the 1986 cuts)”.11 
Carroll et al. (2000a) use a two-year balanced panel of Schedule C filers 
appearing in both 1985 and 1988 to estimate the effects of the 1986 tax reforms on small 
business employment and wage bills. They model the contemporaneous behavior of 
individuals reacting to the tax rates of the current period and find that owners are 12% 
more likely to hire workers and increase salaries after a 10% decrease in the individual 
marginal income-tax rate.  
LaLumia (2008) and Carroll et al. (2000a) estimate probit and least-squares 
models. The present study exploits the flexibility of the Heckman model to allow for 
selection on unobservables in the data to learn more about firms employing labor. The 
                                               
11 Taxes decreased to 38.5% from 50% for the top income-bracket in 1986. In 2001, the top rate was 
immediately reduced to 39.1% from 39.6%, with phased-in reductions to 35% through 2006. 
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two data-generating processes for choosing to employ labor and then choosing a wage 
bill may not be perfectly correlated, as is assumed in the alternative tobit specification. 
Carroll et al. (2000a) simply estimate least-squares regressions on observations with 
positive wage bills. My estimates will show the former least-squares estimates are biased 
with incorrect signs when the decision to employ labor and the wage bill level are not 
independent decisions.
13
  
After replicating the Carroll et al. (2000a) findings, I then extend the literature to 
allow for anticipatory tax planning by firms and for correlation among the error terms in 
the two empirical decisions. I attempt to account for tax planning when tax rates are 
expected to change in the following period. My dataset consists of repeated cross-
sections which allows for potential changes in the true population due to the legal reforms 
governing S-corporations
14
. A two-year panel focuses only on observations appearing in 
both years; Carroll et al. (2000a) report that their results do not statistically change when 
including employers present in only one of the years, so cross-sectional data may be a 
good approximation to the underlying data-generating process. The minute differences 
Carroll et al. (2000a) found indicate their panel results may include a small survivor bias 
and would be upwardly biased for tax rate decreases.  
                                               
13 Carroll et al. (2000a) employ a tobit model as a specification test, but they do not find meaningfully 
different results. OLS estimates on a truncated sample may provide reasonable crude estimates for marginal 
effects since the truncated mean is still fairly linear in x if the two decisions are independent; however, the 
estimates are inconsistent. If the decisions are not independent, OLS on a truncated sample is biased and 
inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi, pg. 540-2). 
14 The 1986 reforms made S-corporations more attractive by increasing the allowed number of 
shareholders. The number of S-corporations as a percentage of all businesses filed with the IRS has 
gradually climbed to 12.5% in 2007 from 6.6% in 1988. 
8 
 
My analysis focuses on the tax reforms of 1993 and 2001-2003 to avoid 
complications arising from the changes to the definition of taxable income that occurred 
in 1986. The 1986 reform, studied by Carroll et al. (2000a), changed the definition of the 
taxable base as well as marginal tax rates, making it impossible to separate and identify 
the two independent effects.
15
 This is a major criticism of all tax literature using only the 
1986 reform for variation.
16
 The 1993 and 2001-2003 reforms isolate the behavioral 
response of Schedule C filers with respect to marginal tax rate changes.
17
 The results 
presented in Appendix A recreate the Carroll et al. (2000a) study using 1993 and 2001-
2003 variation. The estimates provide a bias range for the impact of the definitional 
changes to the taxable-base in 1986. 
 Taxation affects the production mix of small businesses in many ways. Rather 
than simply reacting to current tax rates, business owners are presumably forward-
looking. Many revenues and expenses can be shifted across consecutive tax years when 
upcoming tax changes are anticipated.
19
 Owners can deduct higher levels of expenses by 
                                               
15 The 1986 Tax Reforms changed the definition of taxable income, or the tax base, in many ways, 
including: taxing capital gains as ordinary income, disallowing the deduction of consumer loan interest, 
eliminating income averaging, increasing the standard deduction, increasing the personal exemption 
amount, further restricting tax-deductable IRA contributions, increasing the depreciation lives of equipment 
purchases, limiting the deductions on passive investment losses, and requiring a social security number for 
all dependents claimed. It also made S-corporations more attractive by increasing the allowed number of 
shareholders. 
16 See Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009). 
17 Furthermore, the substantial rate cuts and changes in the definition of the taxable base in 1986 could 
induce changes in the Schedule C taxpayer distribution that would not be reflected in only two years of 
panel data. 
19 This analysis focuses on the net result of timing income since the data is ex-post and only speak to 
covariates that were actually shifted: Benefit of shifting income less the cost of shifting income. 
9 
 
shifting purchases of durable goods to years of relatively high marginal tax rates.
20
 
Higher marginal rates also increase the incentive to deduct personal expenses on the 
Schedule C.
21
 When lower future tax rates are expected, business owners have the 
incentive to time and shift revenue to book in the low-tax year.  
 
3  The Relative Price of Owner Effort 
To allow for the full range of small business owners‟ potential responses to tax 
changes, a theoretical model must account for owner effort and the possibility of 
employing outside labor. The basic assumption is that firm owners maximize utility. 
Utility is increasing in consumption, generated from the firm‟s production and decreasing 
in owner effort (e): 
U = U(C, e)      (1) 
All income earned from the business venture is taxed at the personal income-tax rate 
because the small business is a flow-through tax entity, meaning firm profits and income 
flow through to the owner and are taxed at personal tax rates rather than as a separate 
entity under corporate tax law.  
 Consumption is assumed to be the after-tax net income from the business: 
C = (1-t)M ,      (2) 
where firm net income is denoted by: 
M = X – wL – rK     (3) 
                                               
20 Higher rates can also promote “luxury office” spending that would not take place under relatively lower 
tax rates. Ceteris paribus, Persian rugs, leather and mahogany furniture, and Tiffany lamp purchases are 
more likely to reflect high tax periods than low.  
21 
With proper documentation, meals, entertainment, travel and office supply expenses are appealing 
categories to increase. 
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where X is the production or output of the firm. Output is a function of three possible 
inputs: owner effort, hired labor, and capital. The total labor input is specified as the sum 
of the owner‟s direct labor and outside labor, so that hired labor is perfectly substitutable 
for the owner‟s labor. Owner effort (e) can take two forms: owner labor effort (eL) where 
the owner performs tasks related to direct production (book keeping, sales, etc.) and 
owner managing effort (eM) where the owner monitors the direct production of the 
outside labor he employs
22. The firm‟s concave production function is therefore:    
    X = f(em , L + eL , K)      (4) 
 The owner chooses eM, eL, L, and K to maximize utility (equation 1) subject to 
equations (2), (3), and (4), and the nonnegativity constraints eL ≥ 0 and L ≥ 0. The 
owner‟s optimization problem is therefore: 
L   = U(C, e) + λ0{(1-t)[f*(em , L + eL , K) – wL – rK] - C}  
          em, eL, L      + λ1(eL ) + λ2(L)         (5) 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
    = λ0      (6a) 
   (1-t) λ0     (6b) 
 λ0 (1-t)  = + λ1)  if L = 0, ( Ĺ= L + eL)   (6c) 
     =w if   = 0           (6d) 
fk = r      (6e) 
                                               
22 For simplicity, I assume the supply curve of total owner effort is upward sloping because the vast 
majority of business owners in my sample are married males with adjusted gross incomes below $250,000. 
This reasonable assumption is not necessarily true and leaves the possibility of a backwards bending effort 
supply curve to future work.  
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Condition 1  The complementary slackness condition requires λ1  0 (or λ1 = 0 if eL > 
0) and requires (eL, em, L) to satisfy eL  0. If λ1 > 0, it must be the case that eL = 0. 
Condition 2 The complementary slackness condition requires λ2  0 (or λ2 = 0 if L > 
0) and requires (eL, em, L) to satisfy L  0. If λ2 > 0, it must be the case that L = 0. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions provide two sets of input demand functions: one set when L 
= 0, for non-employers, and the other when L > 0, for employers. The Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions (6a) and (6c) therefore imply: 
 =   if L = 0, 
While (6d) implies:  =w  if   
It is important to notice that when outside labor is employed, taxes only enter the 
optimization problem through the business owner‟s effort. 
 The marginal cost of output is: 
Min  = , 
So when L > 0, as   or, as  . 
Or, as  =  . 
Thus, there is a firm-specific critical value of t such that L = 0 if t < tc and L > 0 if t > tc. 
Over some range it is possible that eL, L > 0.  This will occur when the sum of the 
marginal costs of all owner managing effort and owner labor effort is less than the wage 
that would be paid to outside labor: 
     < w*      (7) 
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The wages paid to outside labor are assumed to be determined in a perfectly competitive 
labor market.  
To distinguish how business owners respond to tax changes, I differentiate 
Equation (7) with respect to t. Recalling that when L = 0, owners equate the marginal 
products of their efforts: , I find that: 
    = 0 , which is clearly positive.   (8) 
Because dt is positive, there exists a value of t where it is optimal for a business owner to 
switch from a regime without employed outside labor to a regime employing labor, L > 
0. 
 The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (6a) and (6b) imply:    =  , together with 
(6c) this implies that = if L=0. It follows that the relevant comparative statics 
are:  
 =   ≡  MRSe,c 
So,  (1-t) =   
d(1-t)= -dt  =d(  
dt = d  = d  =  
dt =  
An increase in the marginal tax rate is a relative decrease in the price of labor because 
taxes are applied to business profits and not revenues; however, the after-tax price of 
13 
 
capital and all other inputs have decreased at identical rates. Hence, the relative price of 
labor is unchanged as a production input but it has changed relative to the price of owner-
effort. 
 Employers: Firms employing outside labor face the Kuhn-Tucker condition that 
λ2 = 0 because L > 0. The firm owner equates his marginal product of managing effort 
with the marginal product of outside labor:  When eL=0,  and 
all changes in the demand for labor and capital are determined by scale effects. So, 
 . 
I would like to find:  , because I know  (or, at least,  = ). 
The business owner‟s first order condition with respect to managing effort is: 
    ,     (9) 
The total derivative of equation (9) is then: 
 
     ,       (10) 
Recalling that, dc = (1-t)dx , the total derivative becomes: 
 
      ,      (11) 
Now, dx = fede, so equation (11) becomes: 
 
     ,       (12) 
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (6a) and (6b), I have the following: 
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 ,  
Neither outside labor nor capital vary directly with taxes (t). 
 +  
      ,       (13) 
It follows that because L and K do not vary directly with t, 
dc =  (1-t)dx =  (1-t)fede ,  so by substitution equation (13) becomes: 
 ,      (14) 
And therefore, 
      (15) 
Recall that:  , 
 rearranging to solve for fe yields the following: 
fe =  , substituting into equation (15), 
 the following expression for  is obtained: 
 
When owner labor effort is zero (eL=0) the marginal cost of effort is greater than the 
market wage: Marginal Cost of Effort > w. 
The corresponding second order condition is:  
 < 0, 
To ensure utility maximization, 
 + (1-t) < 0, 
Solving for the critical value of μ yields the following: 
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 = 0, 
 
Simplifying,   
-  , which is clearly negative. 
 It is possible that over some range of tax rates between the cases when no outside 
labor is employed and when owners provide only managing effort that both owner labor 
effort and outside labor can be positive. This occurs up to the point when the marginal 
costs of managing effort equal the market wage. 
Figure 1.1 displays the optimal owner effort and outside labor choices for any 
given sole proprietorship. The value of the marginal product of total owner effort is 
denoted by the downward sloping curve labeled MP(e). Depending on the business 
owner‟s marginal product of labor, he may or may not employ outside labor in the firm. 
The two full upward sloping curves represent the after-tax marginal cost of owner effort 
under no taxes and then the critical tax rate. The upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0) curve 
represents owners who only exert managing effort, have zero labor effort, and employ 
outside labor. The horizontal axis measures the total amount, or quantity, of owner-effort 
exerted through managing effort and labor effort. The price, or shadow cost, of owner 
effort is listed on the vertical axis.  
Case 1: Firms with zero wage bills may employ outside labor after a tax increase 
due to the relative price increase of owner-effort as a productive input. For any given 
firm, there exists a critical tax rate (tc) such that t > tc implies L > 0. There is also a 
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second critical tax rate (t0) such that t > t0 implies eL = 0 (for simplicity, this is can be 
depicted in Figure 1.1 as MC(e)/(1-t0) but could occur anywhere to the left of the 
marginal cost curve for the critical tax rate). As long as eL > 0, the firm owner simply 
equates his marginal products of managing effort and labor effort [MP(em) = MP(eL)] 
during maximization. But if L > 0, the owner equates the marginal product of his labor 
effort with the competitive wage because his labor effort and outside labor are perfect 
substitutes [MP(eL) = w]. It follows that there is a range of tax rates over which all shifts 
of the after-tax marginal cost curve can cause a one-for-one substitution of managing 
effort for labor effort (em for eL). Once t0 is exceeded, represented by MC(e)/(1-t0), the 
owner does not exert any labor effort; he equates his marginal cost of managing with the 
marginal product of managing: eL = 0 and MC(e) = MC(em) = MP(em) > w. 
For firms originally not employing outside labor, Figure 1.1 shows that 
production decreases, but the firm owner may substitute outside labor for his labor-effort. 
When tax rates increase, owner-effort decreases for the firm but the firm‟s demand for 
outside labor increases as it moves to a positive wage bill from a previous wage bill of 
zero. When the critical tax rate is reached or exceeded, owners begin employing outside 
labor to undertake some of the tasks previously done by the owner. With higher and 
higher tax rates exceeding the critical rate, owners continue to reduce their labor effort, 
employ additional outside labor at the tax-deductable wage, and spend more time 
managing. This pattern continues until the next critical tax rate t0 is reached at which 
owners exert only managing effort. 
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Case 2: Firms with positive wage bills prior to tax increases are denoted by the 
upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0) curve. The firm owners only exert managing effort and upon 
tax increases, the marginal cost of managing effort increases and owners spend less time 
managing. Henceforth, all changes in employment and output are due to the scale effect 
of reduced managerial effort by the owner. After the tax increase, the business owner 
reduces his demand for outside labor, ceteris paribus.  
 
4 Two-Period Intertemporal Production and Tax Avoidance  
 A static single time-period is convenient to model but unrealistic when 
individuals and firms seek to maximize utility and profits over many time periods. When 
this is the case, the decision-maker must account for current tax rates as well as future tax 
rates. For business owners producing different goods and services, the storability of their 
product will directly affect their ability to take advantage of relatively low tax rates in 
some years.
23
  
 With two periods and non-storable products, firms employing labor strive to 
produce and sell in the period of relatively low tax rates. Output and the firm‟s demand 
for outside labor increase in periods of relatively low tax rates. Referring back to Figure 
1.1, firms without employed labor which produce non-storable products utilize only 
owner managing and labor effort. For firms without employees, periods of relatively high 
tax rates induce a higher probability of employing labor as owners substitute away from 
                                               
23 I assume tax-payers have rational expectations or perfect foresight; henceforth, future taxes are known 
with certainty and any deviations are random noise. 
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owner labor effort. Periods of relatively low tax rates imply the firms are less likely to 
employ because owner labor effort is less costly than wages to potential employees. 
 Firms producing storable products have a more complicated maximization 
problem. Augmenting the production function in Section 3 to allow for two time periods, 
I see that firm owners maximize utility subject to the two-period budget constraint. 
Utility is an increasing function of consumption and decreasing in effort in both periods. 
U(c0, c1, e0, e1)     (16) 
Consumption in both periods is simply after-tax income where after-tax income in the 
future period includes the production that was stored from the initial period: 
C0 =(1-t0)M0     (17) 
C1 =(1-t1)M1 , which can also be stated:  
C1 =(1-t1)[ f(e1 , L1 , K1) – wL1 – rK1 + S0].   (18) 
Where income in the initial period is simply production less the amount of production 
(S0) that is carried forward to sell in the next period:    
    M0 = f(e0 , L0 , K0) – wL0 – rK0 – S0]    (19) 
For the case when future tax rates are expected to decline (t1 <t0), the owner 
chooses eM, eL, L, K, c0, c1, and S0 to maximize utility (equation 16) subject to equations 
17 through 19 and the production function, and the nonnegativity constraints L0, L1 ≥ 0. 
With storable production, the owner‟s optimization problem becomes: 
L   = U(c0, c1, e0, e1) +  
eM, eL, L, K, c0, c1, S0    λ0{(1-t0)(1+r)[f*(e0 , L0 , K0) – wL0 – rK0 – S0]  
+ (1-t1)[f*(e1 , L1 , K1) – wL1 – rK1 + S0]– C0 –C1} + λ1L0 + λ2 L1      (20) 
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Taxes enter the optimization problem only through effort and storage of the good. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
    = λ0(1+r)   (21a) 
    = λ1    (21b) 
   (1-t0)(1+r) λ0   (21c) 
   (1-t1)λ0    (21d) 
(1-t0)(1+r) λ0 =   + λ1),  if L = 0, Recall: Ĺ = L+eL (21e) 
(1-t1) λ0 =   + λ2), if L = 0, (Ĺ = L+eL)  (21f) 
   =w if   = 0     (21g) 
      =w if   = 0     (21h) 
 = r     (21i) 
 = r     (21j) 
-(1-t0)(1+r) λ0 +(1-t1) λ0  which implies:    (21k) 
Condition 1  The complementary slackness condition requires λ2  0 (or λ2 = 0 if L > 
0) and requires (eL, em, L) to satisfy L  0. If λ2 > 0, it must be the case that L = 0. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (21a-21d) imply: 
 ,  
which can be rearranged to solve for the marginal rate of substitution of effort and 
consumption.  
      .     (22) 
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Firms not employing outside labor equate the marginal product of owner 
managing effort to the marginal product of owner labor effort which will always be less 
than the competitive market wage (If L=0, ). I simply 
differentiate  (equation 22) with respect to current period taxes (t0) and future taxes 
(t1) to identify how the relative marginal products change in the two periods when one tax 
rates increases. 
 
      < 0 .     (23) 
      > 0 .     (24) 
Equation 23 shows that for increases in current tax rates, or relative decreases in 
future tax rates, firms produce in the current period but store the product and sell 
relatively more in the future when tax rates are relatively low. The marginal product of 
current effort has declined, or the marginal product of future owner effort has risen.  
Equation 24 portrays a similar picture for future tax increases. When future tax 
rates rise, firms want to produce and sell more today because the marginal product of 
future effort declines relative to current owner effort. The current and future tax rate 
comparative statics are identical for both firms with and without outside labor because 
the effect on owner effort is due to the storability of the product. 
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5 The Data 
Using pooled cross-sectional data, a stratified random sample of all taxpayers in 
each year is created. Schedule C taxpayers are assumed to respond identically in each 
year to tax changes, ceteris paribus. Reported wage bill is used as a proxy for 
employment because actual employment levels, or the number of employees, are not 
observed. If firms are less likely to employ labor following tax increases, they should be 
more likely to employ labor, ceteris paribus, under tax rate decreases.
24
 
The data reported on a Schedule C include the aggregate revenues, expenses and 
net income from the business endeavors of sole proprietors.
25
 Schedule C filers can, and 
legally should, include “odd-job” income from people without formal business names or 
practices.
26
 In 2007, 23.1 million returns included a Schedule C filing.
27
 Schedule C 
entities represent about 70% of all IRS documented businesses over 1988-2007.
28
  
Historically, around 70% of Schedule C filers have no wage bills; in 2007, 
salaries and wages accounted for 12.8% of all expenses. The largest expense by 
aggregate small business filers is “Other Business Deductions”, representing almost 25% 
                                               
24
 Note: I am never assuming firms behave symmetrically to tax increases and decreases. 
25
 Schedule C does not include data for S-Corporations and some LLCs. Single member Limited Liability 
Corporations (LLCs) can elect to file a Schedule C. In 2005, of the Schedule C filers, roughly 450,000 were 
registered LLCs.  Multi-member LLCs are type of partnership and file a Schedule E under Partnership 
Income. 
26 For example, an economics professor files a Schedule C to report consulting income but is not 
technically filed with the Secretary of State as a business. This also includes goods sold on eBay; however, 
it typically behooves the seller to not file the Schedule C and avoid reporting the income, particularly when 
the transactions are difficult to track.  
27
 If a taxpayer owns several businesses, a Schedule C is filed separately for each business. 
28
 C-corporations are included in the aggregate IRS business filings. The number of C-corporations drops 
from about 12% in 1988 to 5.8% of all filers in 2007. The number of S-corporations rises from 6.6% to 
12.5% for 1988 and 2007, respectively. 
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of total expenses.
29
 This category includes resource depletion, employee benefit 
programs, legal and professional services
30
, pension and profit-sharing plans, meals and 
entertainment, and home-office business deductions. If tax evasion increases at an 
increasing rate with higher taxes, the incentive to overstate expenses or understate 
revenues will bias employment and wage bill observations and coefficient estimates 
towards zero. 
My analysis will focus on Schedule C data and taxpayer characteristics.
31
 Data 
come from the NBER Public Use File on Individual Income-tax Returns from 1992-2005. 
Each year of data provides a 10% stratified random sample of unaudited and unamended 
tax returns. High-income households are oversampled and there are no missing values in 
the dataset
32
. All upper-income returns that are sampled at greater than 10% are sub-
sampled at 10% to further protect taxpayer identity.
33
 Cross-sectional data capture 
population changes over time and avoid survival biases associated with a balanced panel.  
Using returns only as far back as 1992 is important for several reasons: taxable 
income is defined differently before 1987 (Old Concept) and after 1987 (New Concept), 
                                               
29
 Source: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09sumbulsolprop.pdf 
30
 Legal and professional services include private contractors. 
31 Schedule C data have limited personal characteristic variables; however, the data are rich in income and 
expense variables.  
32 For each year, all of the extreme value AGI filers are not included in the sample because there would be a 
10% chance of selection for each filer. Because of the extreme value omissions 45 filers for 2005 are not 
sampled. 
33 For all filers with AGI greater than $200,000 several codes are completely removed: State Codes, 
Alimony Paid/Received, and State Sales Tax Deduction. This applies to roughly 25% of firms employing 
labor and 6% of firms without labor. Marital Status and number of dependents are also modified. For high 
AGI filers, returns are further modified: the Schedule C fields for salaries and wages, state income-taxes, 
and real estate taxes are blurred by multivariate blurring when two of the three categories have nonzero 
numbers. Multivariate blurring is applied to each of the three categories after sub-grouping, the observation 
is averaged with the two observations closest to it and then the field is replaced with the average value. It is 
important to remember than one observation never contains the full content of the return and often includes 
data from more than one return. 
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“salaries paid to employees” is not included in the dataset until 1987, and the effects of 
the 1986 reforms could linger for several years. Post-1986 data avoids changes in the 
definition of the taxable-base, thereby allowing a consistent definition of taxable income 
and cleaner variation presented by the 1993 and 2003 tax reforms.
34
  
Taxpayers filing only Schedule E are also excluded because the dataset does not 
provide any information on salaries or employment for such entities.
35
 Taxpayers 
receiving social security income are dropped from the dataset because potential retirees 
may operate businesses differently than do non-retirees.
36
 Observations with positive 
AMT
37
 liabilities are excluded because they face different marginal and statutory tax 
rates than peer filers.
38
 Unlike prior literature, all business entities are included, not 
merely those that are profitable.
39
 These observations contain valuable information if 
business losses are one form of sheltering taxable income.
40
 Henceforth, for this analysis, 
loss entities are considered an equilibrium condition, though the results are not affected 
when the observations are omitted. 
 
                                               
34 Furthermore, the data begin in 1992 in order to mitigate any changes in behavior still occurring from the 
1986 rate changes and base changes. Results are not sensitive to including the additional years of 1990 and 
1991.  
35 Schedule E includes business income from partnerships and s-corporations. 
36 Approximately 50,000 observations are omitted. This is consistent with the literature, if the business is a 
hobby, the retiree may be less responsive to incentives, or if the owner is preparing to sell or leave the 
business, behavior may be atypical. 
37 AMT stands for “Alternative Minimum Tax”: approximately 2000 observations in each year, or 6% of 
remaining observations are deleted because of the AMT. 
38 Taxpayers with AMT liabilities do not pay the statutory rates listed in the IRS tax tables. 
39 Loss-entities could serve as a tax-sheltering vehicle but presently past researchers and myself have no 
way of distinguishing between legitimate businesses and tax-shelters in the dataset.  
40 A Schedule C is filed for each business. A taxpayer may file one or several Schedule C‟s. Taxes are paid 
on the net position of all the businesses because the losses of one business offset the taxable income of 
profitable businesses. 
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5a  Data: Summary Statistics 
Selected summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 1.1a and 1.1b. The 
average marginal tax rate over all 402,651 Schedule C filers in the sample is 21.6% but is 
22.65% for filers employing labor.
42
 On average, statutory tax rates decrease slightly over 
the time period: the average future tax rate for all firms is 20.65%. Small-business owners 
have an unconditional average annual wage bill of $70,397 that varies significantly over 
filers, with a standard deviation of $380,083.  Sample wage bills range from $0 to $49.8 
million, with a 26.57% probability of having a positive wage bill. For employers, the 
mean wage bill is significantly higher at $264,914 with a standard deviation of $701,504. 
Such a large variance suggests that truncation is likely and that a truncated model could 
outperform a standard model for the data. 
Not surprisingly, Schedule C filers report much higher adjusted gross incomes 
than the average population. With mean AGI of $746,074 and a standard deviation of 
$4.1 million the data provide much variation over income: ranging from -$337 million to 
$534 million. These businesses receive up to $2.36 billion in Schedule C Receipts with a 
mean of $730,894 and standard deviation of $10.1 million. Taxable business income 
ranges from -$140 million to $50.9 million with a mean of $91,812 and a standard 
deviation of $625,028.
43
  
                                               
42 All dollar figures are adjusted for inflation and stated in 2005 real dollars. 
43
 Losses can occur for a number of reasons including: start-up costs, large capital expenditures or 
depreciation. Start-up costs were limited to $5,000 in excess of revenues for 2009; anything in excess of 
that is amortized over the next 15-years. 
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The raw correlations of the wage bill and the current tax rate and the future tax 
rate are 0.145 and 0.147, respectively. The current marginal tax rate and the future 
marginal tax rate are highly correlated with a raw correlation of 0.94.  
 
6a Empirical Analysis Allowing for Intertemporal Substitution of Owner Effort 
My interest lies in the probability of a firm employing labor and the firm‟s level 
of employment. The Heckman 2-step model uses information on both businesses 
employing labor (employers) and businesses not employing labor (non-employers) to 
estimate the conditional wage bill elasticity. It allows for the presence of a limited 
dependent variable (employing labor) and correlated processes for choosing to employ 
and then the level of employment, conditional on having chosen to employ.  
My goal is to identify the two distinct effects of changes in current tax rates and 
future tax rates on both the probability of employing labor and total employment. The 
theoretical framework presented in Section 3 shows that both the probability of 
employing labor and the wage bill depend on the specifics of the production function 
with respect to owner labor-effort, managing-effort and employment of outside labor, as 
well as the optimal scale of the firm.  
The decision to employ labor is made once some threshold is passed. This 
threshold will depend on the managerial skill of the business owner; the costs associated 
with employing any labor: the administrative burdens of payroll, employee taxes, current 
and future tax rates, and access to lines of credit to maintain payroll. When the threshold 
is reached, the firm employs labor and must then decide how much labor to employ. If 
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firms take equilibrium wages as given, the amount of labor employed varies directly with 
the wage bill variable.  
The amount of labor employed depends on many of the same variables included 
in the employment decision; however, variables that affect only the fixed costs of 
employing labor are not included. The two decisions are very closely related, so a flexible 
framework is needed to allow for any correlation between the two decisions. The 
Heckman selection model allows for precisely such flexibility.  
The first step is to estimate the change in the probability of employing labor, 
which is explained by the following probit model:  
 = β0τi,t + β1τi,t+1 + X’β + εi , where       (1) 
The parameter, β0, measures the contemporaneous effect of current tax rate changes while 
β1 estimates the anticipatory effect of tax rate changes in the next year.  The future tax 
rate parameter, β1, reflects the ability to shift income (Revenue-Expenses) across 
consecutive tax periods. Empirically, the future tax rate may or may not be certain but I 
assume tax-payers have rational expectations; henceforth, future taxes are known with 
certainty and any deviations are random noise. The data report actual tax rates as proxies 
for expectations. Tax reforms can induce both contemporaneous and anticipatory effects. 
All tax rates are statutory rates which serve as exogenous proxies for marginal tax rates.
44
 
The X-vector includes variables thought to influence the firm‟s decision to 
employ outside labor. The vector β is the conformable parameter vector for the 
covariates. Capital income (the sum of interest and dividends) and personal property 
                                               
44 For more discussion on the effective marginal and statutory rates refer to Section 2. 
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taxes are used to proxy for a taxpayer‟s assets which may affect a business owner‟s labor 
supply, ability to re-invest in the firm and obtain outside financing.
45
 Capital income and 
personal property taxes are included to reflect the capital constraints facing the business. 
Firms with larger capital stocks will find it easier to obtain loans and lines of credit to 
fund payrolls.  
Depreciation is observed for each Schedule C and serves as an industry proxy 
because some industries with large depreciation expenses (manufacturing) are less labor-
intensive than businesses with small depreciation expenses (consulting or law), which 
could affect the firm‟s labor-demand.46 The number of dependents (exemptions) and 
marital-status proxy for the business owner‟s preferences for consumption, labor and 
leisure. Two indicator variables for the presence of other businesses (partnerships and S-
corps filed on a Schedule E, and farms filed on a Schedule F) and the amount of Schedule 
E income are also included in the selection equation
47
.  
                                               
45 My proxy for capital income, is a very poor measure of tax-payer wealth but as in previous research, is 
included as a proxy for the ease of funding: for example, a business owner with large amounts of capital 
income will receive more offers and lower interest rates from potential lenders than a business owner with 
limited assets to pledge as collateral. Interest and dividend income is used because such sources are 
considered more stable than capital gains. Capital gains fluctuate much more than other measures of access 
to capital and are also very sensitive to capital gains (losses) tax rates and laws. See Feldstein (1997) for a 
detailed analysis. 
46
 Depreciation expenses could be a lagged or jointly-determined variable given both capital and labor are 
required for production. However, most small firms do not depreciate any assets. For firms with 
depreciation expenses, any changes in response to current and future tax rates will be very small relative to 
a firm‟s total depreciation expense or capital expenditures because depreciated property is typically written 
off over 5-39 years and not taken until the asset is “ready and available for use”. Automobiles are typically 
depreciated over five years while nonresidential property is depreciated over 39 years. I follow past 
research and include depreciation because I think the benefits outweigh the costs. See 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p946/ch01.html#en_US_2010_publink1000107327 for a full discussion. 
47 Schedule E firms are typically owned by one to three people. The S-corporation classification allows up 
to 100 shareholders; however, S-corporations with more than ten shareholders constitute only 0.06% of all 
S-corporations. 
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The indicators for other businesses reflect the threshold effect of employing 
labor.
48
 Employing labor includes fixed costs that must be borne by the owner: 
familiarizing oneself with a payroll system, and learning and maintaining labor-specific 
regulations and administrative up-keep. Once an owner has undertaken such costs once, it 
is virtually costless to apply the knowledge to other enterprises.
49
 The variable for the 
level of Schedule E income allows for the success (or loss) of one business to potentially 
flow through to the other firm operated by the same taxpayer.
50
   
The independent variables are used to estimate the inverse Mills ratio which is 
then used as a variable in the second stage. Consistent with previous literature, state-level 
fixed effects are not used because 25% of all firms employing labor do not possess a state 
indicator variable due to blurred data on high-income taxpayers. Omitting the blurred 
high-income observations to model the State-level fixed-effects substantially skews the 
results. 
The second stage regression includes only the variables in X that directly affect 
the magnitude or level of employment and not the decision to employ. The second stage 
regression also includes the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage to account for any 
selection on unobservables by employers:  
yi = β0τi,t + β1τi,t+1 + β2X + εi    (2) 
                                               
48 It would be nice to include an indicator only if labor is actually employed in the other business; however, 
my data do not provide wage bills for the Schedule E or the Schedule F. 
49 For example, if a taxpayer runs a seasonal farm and files a Schedule F as well as a Schedule C for 
another business, that taxpayer has already forgone the fixed costs associated with employing labor because 
farms are relatively labor-intensive. This lowers the initial fixed cost of employing labor in the Schedule C 
business. 
50 This relationship need not be positive, though it could be: a firm owner with one successful enterprise 
may be more or less likely to have success in a second endeavor. 
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The vector Xi includes the same variables included in the probit model but excludes the 
indicator variables for other businesses, because the variables only affect the decision to 
employ and not the level of employment. The Schedule E and F indicator variables are 
the only variables omitted from the second stage regression; this also ensures full 
identification in the Heckman model.  
The current tax rate, future tax rate, capital income, personal property taxes, 
depreciation expenses, number of dependents, marital status, and the level of Schedule E 
income constitute Xi. As in the probit model, the coefficients on the two tax variables are 
separately identified to estimate the impact of contemporary and anticipatory firm 
responses. The coefficient on the current tax rate reflects contemporaneous behavior 
responding to current period changes. The effect of a change in the future tax rate is 
important because it affects business owners‟ labor-leisure decisions in the current year 
and reflects their ability to shift income (output) across two periods. This implies the 
short-run response is larger than the long-run response. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the 
future rate signals that employed labor will be relatively less valuable as a production 
input in the future than in the present. Decreases in the future tax rate signal that 
employed labor is relatively less valuable in the current year than in the future year. The 
parameter β1 reflects the incentive of business owners to adjust the timing of their own 
labor, revenues and expenses across time periods to take advantage of relatively low tax 
rates, or to avoid relatively high tax rates.  
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6b Estimation 
For the full sample of observations in 1992-2005, the Heckman model estimates 
are reported in Table 1.2. Column 1 displays the marginal effects from the probit 
model.
53
 Estimates over the entire time period (1992-2005) provide a local average 
treatment effect for small business employment and wage bill decisions responding to 
marginal tax rate changes.
54
 Employment and wage bill estimates will be biased towards 
zero when higher tax rates induce tax evasion and miss-reporting because owners have 
the incentive to reduce employment but overstate the wage bill.
55
 
The marginal effects of interest show that a one percentage point increase in 
current tax rates increases the probability of employing outside labor by 1.18%. This 
represents the contemporaneous response of business owners to current period tax 
changes. A one percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate next year decreases the 
probability of employing labor today by 0.70%.
56
 The opposite signs on the two tax 
coefficients relay very different behavioral responses. In the short-run, reflected by 
current tax rate changes, owners decrease their own labor effort and switch to monitoring 
outside labor. Conversely, future tax rate changes induce slowed production in the firm 
and a decrease in the firm‟s demand for all factors of production: employed labor, capital 
and owner effort.  
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 The observations are distributed evenly through the years with roughly 19,500 observations per year. 
54 See Figure (5) for exact tax rate changes. 
55 The wage bill, or wage bills, is a tax-deductable business expense.  
56 At first glance the large negative correlation coefficient in the Heckman analysis may seem unusual; 
however, it simply states that for firms with low probabilities of employing labor, holding the observable 
variables constant, if the unobservable characteristics increase the firm‟s probability of employing labor 
then the firm is likely to have a low wage bill if they actually do employ labor. A similar story can be told 
for firms with high probabilities of employing labor while holding observed characteristics constant. 
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The second stage regression in Column 3 shows that a one percentage point 
increase in the current tax rate reduces the mean wage bill by $7,678; whereas a one 
percentage point increase in the future tax rate increases the mean wage bill by $8,707. 
Given firms take market wages as exogenous, the results from the first and second stages 
imply that current-period tax increases reduce average wage bills because of lower 
production and because more owners are going to employ outside labor when the price of 
outside labor drops relative to the price of owner labor.  
Consistent with the two-period model in Section 4, increases in future tax rates 
make production today more attractive relative to production tomorrow; hence, firms 
employ more people to boost current period production and shift away from the next 
period‟s relatively high taxes. Relatively high marginal tax rates in future periods imply 
owners‟ labor effort is relatively less valuable tomorrow than it is today: more leisure is 
consumed in high tax periods and the owner‟s managerial effort and employed labor are 
complements.
57
  
The mean and median wage bill elasticities with respect to current tax rate 
changes are -0.17 and -0.64, respectively. The future tax rate elasticity is 0.18 for the 
mean and 0.65 for the median. These estimates differ from those by Carroll et al. (2000a), 
0.37 for current tax changes, and LaLumia (2008) found insignificant estimates. 
Operating another business (limited liability) or farm, which suggests that the 
fixed costs of employing labor have already been borne by the owner, increases the 
                                               
57 The time horizon of observations is important to capture the behavioral effects. For this analysis, 
including two periods is all that is feasible. 
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probability of employing labor in the sole proprietorship by 7.86% and 12.57%, 
respectively. A $100,000 increase in depreciation expenses increases the probability of 
employing labor by 25.7%. In the second stage (Column 3), a $1 increase in capital 
income, depreciation and business income earned outside the sole proprietorship, 
increases wage bills by $0.22, $0.34 and $0.03, respectively. 
None of the estimates reported in Table 1.2 differ appreciably between the linear 
and logarithmic specifications. The natural-log specification yields virtually identical 
estimates and thus, are not reported. Furthermore, the density for the logarithm of wage 
bills is approximately normal, justifying the Heckman assumption of normality. Figure 
1.2 shows the kernel density for wage bills for all observations with firms employing 
labor. The median wage bill of $264,914 for firms employing labor implies 50% of the 
distribution occurs well below the sample mean of $89,790. 
6c  Behavioral Differences by Firm Size 
 Segmenting the data by gross business receipts lends insight to how differently 
sized firms respond to tax changes. There are noticeable differences in the data around 
$250,000 and $3.5 million in gross receipts. As shown in Tables 1.3a and 1.3b, small, 
medium and large firms respond differently to tax changes.  
 The probit analysis in the upper half of Table 1.5 shows medium to large firms are 
more likely to contemporaneously respond to current tax increases by employing outside 
labor and reducing owner labor effort. Medium and large firms are also more likely to 
reduce production when future tax rates increase. Firms with gross receipts in excess of 
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$3.5 million are 6.66% less likely to employ labor in the current period if the tax rate is 
known to increase one percentage point next period. 
 As expected, the coefficient signs are positive on the farm indicator for all firm 
sizes but the changing sign on the indicator for other businesses (limited liability firms 
and S-corporations) is worth noting. Firms with gross receipts of $250,000 or less are 
9.63% more likely to employ labor when another business is present. Medium and large 
firms are respectively 15.66% and 7.37% less likely to employ when another business 
entity exists. The main difference among the firms is the type of business filing the 
Schedule C in a given gross receipt range. My data do not include industry classification, 
but in the aggregate report produced by the IRS high gross-receipt firms are more likely 
to include consultants, financial services (insurance, securities brokers, investment 
banking), and professional sciences than smaller firms which are largely comprised of 
construction, real estate and leasing, and wholesale and retail trade.
58
  
The second stage estimates suggest that medium and large firms are more likely 
than small firms to shift production to periods of relatively low tax rates, as evidenced by 
the large positive wage bill coefficients on future tax rates. 
 Table 1.3b summarizes elasticity estimates for firms with differently sized gross 
receipts. The results support Figure 1.1 previously depicted in Section 3 with regard to 
current tax changes. Small firms are not as likely as large firms to employ outside labor; 
small firms are likely to rely solely on the owner‟s labor-effort prior to tax increases. 
Current-period tax increases decrease the relative price of outside labor versus owner-
                                               
58 See http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=134481,00.html for industry data in each year. 
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effort for small and marginal firms, which do indeed employ more outside labor. Large 
firms, which are more likely to employ labor initially, cut production and demand for all 
inputs when current period taxes increase.  
Medium and large firms respond similarly to future tax changes, but large firms 
react more to current tax changes. Large firms have a median wage bill elasticity of -0.20, 
whereas small firms have a wage bill elasticity of -5.41 with respect to future tax rates, 
suggesting their production is very sensitive to market expectations and growth 
incentives.  
 
7 Elasticity Estimates for the Specific Reforms of 1993 and 2001-2003  
The nature of the OBRA-93 and EGTRRA are very different with OBRA-93 only 
increasing marginal tax rates on high income-taxpayers and EGTRRA reducing tax rates 
on all income brackets. EGTRRA was phased in gradually over three years, whereas 
OBRA-93 occurred in a single tax year. These structural differences could affect taxpayer 
behavior and elasticity estimates. Elasticity estimates are presented in Table 1.4 for the 
individual tax reforms, OBRA-93 and EGTRRA and JGTRRA in 2001-2003. Roughly 
30% of firms employed outside labor during 1992-1994 as seen in Column 1. Only 25% 
of observations employed labor in the 2001-2005 sample. The mean and median wage 
bill elasticities for the 1993 current tax increases are -0.47 and -0.60, respectively. The 
wage bill elasticity with respect to future tax rates is 0.12 at the mean. The 2001-2005 
elasticity estimates reflect more modest responses at -0.27 and -0.31 for the mean and 
median, respectively. The mean future tax rate elasticity is 0.10 for the 143,054 
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observations in 2001-2005. The relatively modest estimates for EGTRRA may reflect the 
gradual nature of the tax reform. 
I notice a general decline in the probability of employing labor over time in the 
sample. This could be due to the rise in popularity of the S-corporation and the decline of 
Schedule C filers. The decline in employment could be a symptom of the changing 
business environment with more one-man shops opening due to the rise of the Internet. 
The kernel densities in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 suggest the former explanation is more 
likely to be supported by the data. The wage bill kernel density estimates for the two time 
periods look very similar with the exception of firms with wage bills in excess of $5 
million.  Each year contains approximately the same number of observations but firms 
with large wage bills appear to be dropping out of the sample between 1994 and 2001. 
Firms with larger wage bills may be opting for S-corporation status and filing Schedule E 
instead of Schedule C. As shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4, employers in 1992-1994 were 
more evenly distributed over the $5 million to $30 million range. In 2001-2005, the 
majority of employers fall in the $5 million to $10 million range.  
Tax-return data only provide wage bills for Schedule C filers; hence, the estimates 
reflect only sole-proprietorships and single-owner LLCs. To the extent these businesses 
are similar to S-corporations and partnerships, the results provide an accurate estimate of 
the employment effects of small businesses. S-corporations tend to be larger than other 
small business entities whereas most service businesses (doctors, lawyers, dentists) file as 
partnerships and limited liability corporations. Because of the preferential treatment 
given to S-corporations under the 1986 tax reforms, the entity has continued to rise in 
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popularity. Future research may want to investigate the behavioral and labor decisions of 
S-corporations with respect to tax rate changes.  
 
8 Omitted Variable Bias: Implications of Excluding Future Tax Rates 
Table 1.5 compares a Heckman model with both current and future tax rates to a 
Heckman model with only current tax rates in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Including 
only current tax rates biases the marginal effect on employing labor upwards in the first 
stage, as shown in Column 2 where a one percentage point change in current tax rates 
implies firms are 5.02% more likely to employ outside labor.  
Excluding the future tax variable results in a positive coefficient in the second 
stage for wage bills instead of the negative coefficient reported in Column 1. Marginal 
effects and coefficients for the other independent variables change little when future tax 
rates are excluded. Column 3 reports the least-squares regression using both future and 
current tax rates. Column 4 omits the future-tax-rate regressor but is otherwise identical 
to Column 3. Column 4 is most similar to the methodology employed by Carroll et al. 
(2000a) and LaLumia (2008). The first stage is a probit model independent of the second 
stage, which is a least-squares regression on only observations with positive wage bills.  
The bias occurs from estimating the entire behavioral effect as contemporaneous 
instead of decomposing the response to also account for the anticipatory effect. Omitting 
future tax rates as an explanatory variable induces an omitted variable bias that skews the 
interpretation of the current and future tax rate coefficients and marginal effects but 
leaves the other coefficients unchanged.  
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Recall that my Heckman estimates reported in Table 1.2 report a median wage bill 
elasticity with respect to current tax rates of 0.65. For comparison, Carroll et al. (2000a) 
estimated a median wage bill elasticity of 0.37. Carroll et al. (2000a) estimated that a 
marginal tax increase of 1% decreases the mean probability of hiring workers by 1.2% 
for a balanced panel in 1986 and 1988. LaLumia (2008) used five-years of panel-data 
beginning in 1999 and did not find any results of statistical significance for the 
probability of hiring labor or changes in wage bills. LaLumia (2008) explains that 
observation weighting and the nature of the two tax reforms accounts for the difference 
between her estimates and those by Carroll et al. (2000a). The 2001 reforms reduced the 
tax rates in every bracket but the 1986 reforms focused only on the top income bracket 
and also broadened the taxable base. Similar to my data, Carroll et al. (2000a) use data 
with oversampled high-AGI taxpayers whereas LaLumia (2008) uses unweighted data.  
 
9 Specification Testing: The Bias of OLS on Positive Wage Bill Observations 
The Heckman specification allows for the possibility of unobserved differences 
between employers and non-employers. Some owners are more likely to employ workers 
because of the nature of their business. For example, a cleaning business is more likely to 
have staff employees than an economic consultant or a tax accountant. Furthermore, 
business owners with better managerial skills are more likely to employ outside labor and 
are likely to employ more workers than a poor manager. The Heckman allows for such 
possibilities and estimates the relationship. The assumption of independence used by 
Carroll et al (2000a) and LaLumia (2008) implicitly assumes all business owners are 
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equally efficient managers. Independence also assumes all firms, regardless of industry 
affiliation and size, are equally likely to employ. My theoretical model and empirical 
results find the assumption of independence unrealistic. 
Table 1.6 summarizes results from the truncated and standard OLS regression and 
contrasts the estimates with the tobit and Heckman specifications. Column 1 restates the 
second stage estimates from the Heckman results reported in Table 1.2.  
The tobit model in Column 2 assumes both the participation and spending 
equations are drawn from the same distribution with identical covariates. Tobit estimates 
are presented as a specification test. Similar to the Heckman specification, the tobit 
allows for correlation between the two equations but imposes strict assumptions about the 
type of relationship.  
The tobit is nested in the Heckman as the special case when the correlation 
coefficient, rho, equals 1. This assumes the selection and expense decisions are perfectly 
correlated. The tobit estimates for current and future marginal tax rates are $6,810 and -
$2,391, respectively, which differ dramatically from the Heckman estimates of -$7,678 
and $8,707. The tobit estimates often have different signs than the Heckman estimates; 
this is indicative of the positive relationship assumed in the tobit model instead of the 
estimated correlation of -0.95.  
A likelihood ratio test examining the Heckman and tobit model fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that the Heckman is the true model at 0.01%; therefore, the Heckman 
model is preferred to the more restrictive tobit. 
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Columns 3 and 4 show the different covariate estimates for a least-squares 
regression on positive wage bill observations and a standard least-squares regression on 
all observations. As mentioned earlier, truncated data with a large variance are typically 
analyzed efficiently using a truncated model instead of standard OLS. As expected, 
standard OLS is outperformed by least-squares estimation on only positive observations.   
 Standard OLS in Column 3 weights employers and non-employers equally and 
shows the mean result of a tax change on the entire sample. Past research estimates a 
probit model for the probability of employing labor that would be identical to the first 
stage estimates in the Heckman model. For the wage bill response, past research simply 
performs OLS on positive wage-bill observations, this method is displayed in Column 4. 
The Column 4 estimates are calculated under the false assumption of no correlation 
between the selection and wage bill equations. Least-squares estimation on positive 
observations assumes that the two decisions are independent, whereas the Heckman 
model allows for independence while accommodating potential correlation. The least-
squares method biases the estimates towards finding no result. Failing to account for 
employer selection on unobservables produces very different estimates with much lower 
magnitudes and sometimes opposite signs.  
 
10 Conclusion 
Changes in tax rates have intertemporal effects. Focusing only on 
contemporaneous adjustments underestimates the true behavioral responses of business 
owners to tax changes. My analysis has decomposed the total effect of changing tax rates 
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into two important parts: current responses and preparations for the future. The future-tax 
coefficient provides an estimate for the ability to shift income and entrepreneurial effort 
across consecutive tax periods. Modeling separate tax rates helps to separate the 
contemporaneous responses to current tax changes from the anticipatory reactions to 
future tax changes.  
Using pooled cross-sectional tax return data from 1992-2005, I estimate the small 
business probability of employing labor and employment level for Schedule C filers with 
respect to statutory tax-rate changes. Economic theory predicts that small businesses 
using productive inputs of owner-effort, labor and capital may be more or less likely to 
employ labor after tax increases due to the relative price increase of owner-effort and the 
substitutability of owner-labor and tax-deductable outside labor.  
My findings support the theoretical model that employing labor involves variable 
wage and monitoring costs, in addition to the fixed costs of payroll systems and 
administration. From the probit estimates of the Heckman 2-step analysis, a one 
percentage point increase in current tax rates increases the probability of employing 
outside labor by 1.18 percent. This represents the contemporaneous response of business 
owners to current period tax changes. A one percentage point increase in the marginal tax 
rate next year decreases the probability of employing labor today by 0.70 percent.  
In the short-run (reflected by current tax rate changes), owners decrease their own 
labor effort and switch to monitoring outside labor. Conversely, future tax rate changes 
induce slowed production in the firm and a decrease in the firm‟s demand for all factors 
of production. The mean and median wage bill elasticities with respect to current tax 
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rates are -0.17 and -0.64, respectively. The comparable elasticities with respect to future 
tax rates are 0.18 for the mean and 0.65 for the median. These estimates are almost 
double the largest estimates reported in the previous literature. 
Given that wages paid in the labor market are competitive, the results from the 
first and second stages together show that current-period tax increases reduce average 
wage bills because of lower production, while some owners substitute toward hired labor 
when its price drops relative to the price of the owner‟s own labor. Increases in future tax 
rates make production today more attractive relative to production tomorrow, indicating 
that firms anticipating higher future taxes shift production intertemporally. 
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Table 1.1a 
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Taxpayers 1992-2005 
 
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Marginal Tax Rate (τ) 27.00% 21.60% 14.43% 0% 39.60%
Future Marginal Tax Rate (τ+1) 25.00% 20.65% 15.21% 0% 39.60%
Probability of Employing Labor 0% 26.57% 44.17% 0% 100%
Wage Bill $0 $70,397 $380,083 $0 $49,800,000
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) $90,443 $746,074 $4,134,146 -$337,000,000 $534,000,000
Gross Receipts (Schedule-C) $49,180 $730,894 $10,100,000 -$3,079,748 $2,360,000,000
Depreciation $133 $17,527 $121,255 $0 $19,000,000
Capital Income $1,001 $65,230 $541,515 $0 $79,600,000
Taxable Business Income (Schedule-C) $9,005 $91,812 $625,028 -$140,000,000 $50,900,000
Observations 402,651
Note: Gross receipts are negative due to firms electing to use accrual accounting methods.
Summary Statistics include the median, mean, minimum and maximum for observations employing labor, and those not employing labor, for all years 
included in the dataset. 
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Table 1.1b 
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Taxpayers Conditional on Employing, or not 
Employing, Labor 1992-2005 
 
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Conditional on Employing Labor
     Marginal Tax Rate (τ) 28.00% 22.65% 14.14% 0.00% 39.60%
     Future Marginal Tax Rate (τ+1) 27.50% 21.47% 15.07% 0.00% 39.60%
     Wage Bill $89,790 $264,914 $701,504 $1 $49,800,000
     Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) $118,068 $437,067 $3,854,542 -$337,000,000 $440,000,000
     Gross Receipts (Schedule-C) $621,010 $1,628,747 $6,653,973 -$2,714,034 $1,120,000,000
     Depreciation $10,835 $45,042 $179,785 $0 $14,600,000
     Capital Income $1,343 $47,506 $531,592 $0 $79,600,000
     Taxable Business Income (Schedule-C) $63,312 $191,003 $758,471 -$63,600,000 $43,200,000
     Observations 106,999
Conditional on not Employing Labor
     Marginal Tax Rate (τ) 25.00% 21.22% 14.51% 0.00% 39.60%
     Future Marginal Tax Rate (τ+1) 15.00% 20.36% 15.25% 0.00% 39.60%
     Wage Bill - - - - -
     Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) $79,472 $857,907 $4,225,226 -$246,000,000 $534,000,000
     Gross Receipts (Schedule-C) $20,565 $405,956 $11,100,000 -$3,079,748 $2,360,000,000
     Depreciation $0 $7,569 $89,179 $0 $19,000,000
     Capital Income $855 $71,645 $544,921 $0 $75,300,000
     Taxable Business Income (Schedule-C) $4,796 $55,914 $564,799 -$140,000,000 $50,900,000
     Observations 295,652
Note: Gross receipts are negative due to firms electing to use accrual accounting methods.
Summary Statistics for employers are substantially larger than for non-employers, particularly for median and mean AGI, gross receipts, depreciation and
taxable Schedule C business income. Schedule C businesses with large gross receipts but not employing labor include firms in consulting, finance and
insurance, and professional, scientific and technical services.
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Table 1.2 
Heckman Selection 2-Step Estimates for Schedule C Business Owners 1992-2005 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman Heckman
First-Stage Standard Second-Stage Standard
Independent Variables Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Current Tax Rate 1.18*** (0.04) -7,678.47*** (538.44)
Future Tax Rate -0.70*** (0.04) 8,707.42*** (491.92)
Capital Income -1.16*** (0.06) 0.22*** (0.01)
Depreciation 25.70*** (0.20) 0.34*** (0.03)
Non-Schedule C Business Income 0.36*** (0.02) 0.03*** (0.00)
Other Businesses: Indicator 7.86*** (0.47) - -
Other Business: Farm Indicator 12.57*** (0.86) - -
Constant -2.21*** (0.08) 2,811,514*** (137586)Observations 402,554 402,554
Correlation Coefficient ( ρ ) -0.95
Likelihood Ratio 20,289
R
2
0.044
Wald Test (prob>chi^2) 3734.9*** (0.00)
Observations 402,554 402,554
     Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity -0.17
Median Elasticity -0.64
     Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity 0.18
Median Elasticity 0.65
Table 2
Heckman Selection 2-Step Estimates for Wage Bill of Schedule-C Business-Owners Employing Labor 
for the years 1992-2005
Columns 1and 3 display results from the Heckman Selection 2-step model for employment and wage bill responses to changing
tax rates. Column 1 displays the marginal effects from the first-stage of the Heckman estimation (a probit model). All marginal
effects in Column 1 are changes in the probability of employing labor for a one-unit change in the independent variable. A
current tax increase of 1 percentage point increases the probability of employing labor in the current period by 1.18%. All dollar
denominated variables are in $100,000s so a $100,000 increase in Capital Income, decreases the probability of employing labor
by 1.16%. Running another business, whether an S-corp or a farm, increases the probability of employing labor by 7.86% and
12.57%, respectively. For the second-stage presented in Column 3, all coefficients show the dollar increase in the wage bill for a
1 unit change in the independent variable, given the firm employs labor. Conditional on employing labor, a 1 percentage point
increase in the current tax rate decreases wage bills by $7678.47, reflecting the scale effect of lower production at higher
marginal tax rates. The positive coefficient on the future tax rate reflects the intertemporal substitution as labor and production
become relatively more valuable today and less valuable tomorrow when tomorrow's tax rates are expected to increase. A $1
increase in Depreciation Expenses increases salary expenses by $0.34. Mean and median elasticities are reported for each
specification. Controls for the marital status, number of dependents, and property taxes are also included. The Wald Test is
significant at 0.01%.
Note: All std. errors are adjusted standard errors. (***) indicated significance at 0.01%. Elasticities are average point-estimates that use the
mean or median salary expense, respectively.  
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Table 1.3a 
Behavioral Differences by Firm Size as Measured by Gross Business Receipts 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations
Observations  $250k ≤ Receipts Observations
Receipts < $250k  < $3.5m Receipts ≥ $3.5m All Observations
First-Stage Probit: 
Current Marginal Tax Rate 0.33*** 1.25*** 1.01*** 1.18***
(Std Error) (0.06) (0.01) (0.31) (0.04)
Future Marginal Tax Rate -1.29*** -1.57*** -6.66** -0.70***
(Std Error) (0.06) (0.00) (2.97) (0.04)
Non-Schedule C Business Income 0.180 -0.17*** -0.04 0.36***
     (Std. Error) (0.22) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
Other Businesses: Indicator 9.63*** -15.66*** -7.37** 7.86***
     (Std. Error) (0.70) (0.88) (2.78) (0.47)
Other Business: Farm Indicator 10.51*** 6.89*** 12.13** 12.57***
     (Std. Error) (1.28) (1.60) (4.42) (0.86)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations
Observations  $250k ≤ Receipts Observations
Receipts < $250k  < $3.5m Receipts ≥ $3.5m All Observations
Second-Stage Regression:
Current Marginal Tax Rate 827.09*** -751.74*** -10,104.70** -7,678.47***
(Std Error) (233.74) (210.05) (5117.24) (538.44)
Future Marginal Tax Rate -2652.91*** 1470.13*** 7398.44*** 8,707.42***
(Std Error) (315.91) (211.19) (4818.91) (491.92)
Capital Income 0.01*** -0.003 0.617*** 0.22***
(Std Error) (0.00) (0.003) (0.03) (0.01)
Depreciation 2.19*** 0.36*** 0.370*** 0.34***
(Std Error) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03)
S-Corp Business Income -0.01*** -0.001 0.078*** 0.03***
(Std Error) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
     Correlation Coefficient (ρ) 0.937 0.086 -0.882 -0.953
     Pseudo-R
2
0.019 0.033 0.028 0.044
     Observations 286,437 102,949 13,168 402,554
Note: (***) denotes significance at 0.01%, (**) denotes significance at 5% and (*) at 10%.
The overall dataset on Schedule-C business filers is divided by the level of gross business receipts. Heckman estimates for observations with
gross business receipts under $250,000 are presented in Column 1 while companies with receipts of at least $250k but less than $3.5million are
in Column 2 and those with receipts of $3.5million and up are presented in Column 3. The three columns relay that differently sized firms do in
fact respond differently to personal income tax changes. Larger firms are much more sensitive to changes in taxrates than small firms. Larger
firms are also more likely to time production by intertemporally substituting away from producing in years of relatively high tax rates, as
evidenced by the positive coefficients on Future Tax Rates in Columns 2 and 3 for the second stage Heckman estimates. For permanent tax
increases (the coefficient on current marginal tax rate), small firms are dominated by the change in the relative price of owner-effort and actually
increase employment; whereas the decreased production by larger firms dominates the change in the relative price of owner-effort. The fourth
column re-states the findings from Table 2 in the overall model. The probit coefficients are marginal effects at the mean for current and future
tax rates. All columns include the standard controls for marital status, the number of dependents and personal property taxes. All dollars are
inflation-adjusted, chained 2005 dollars.
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Table 1.3b 
Robustness Check: Cutting the Data by Firm Size,  
as Measured by Gross Business Receipts 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations
Observations  $250k ≤ Receipts Observations
Receipts < $3.5m Receipts ≥ $3.5m Receipts ≥ $3.5m All Observations
     Probability of Employing Labor:
Mean: 9.99% 66.29% 76.89% 25.00%
     Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity 1.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.17
Median Elasticity - -0.10 -0.20 -0.64
     Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity -5.41 0.06 0.06 0.18
Median Elasticity - 0.17 0.14 0.65
     Observations 286,437 102,949 13,168 402,554
Note: Elasticities are average point-estimates that use the mean or median salary expense for the respective observations.
The elasticity estimates using the coefficients reported in Table 5a are reported for "small", "medium" and "large" firms, by gross business receipts, for all
observations in the 1992-2005 dataset. Larger firms are much more likely to employ labor than small firms and have wage bills that are more sensitive to changes
in current tax rates. Medium and large firms respond identically in magnitudes to increases in future taxes. Median elasticities are not reported in Column 1
because the median wage bill for small firms in the dataset is $0, which yeilds an elasticity estimate of 7.75 for both current and future tax rates.
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Table 1.4 
Elasticity Estimates for Specific Tax Reforms 
 (OBRA-93 and EGTRRA-JGTRRA 2001-2003) 
 
(1) (2) (3)
1992-1994 2001-2005 All Observations
Probability of Employing Labor:
Mean: 29.78% 24.68% 26.57%
Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity -0.47 -0.27 -0.17
Median Elasticity -0.60 -0.31 -0.64
Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity 0.117 0.103 0.18
Median Elasticity 0.096 0.127 0.65
     Observations 99,091 143,054 402,554
Note: Elasticities are average point-estimates that use the mean or median salary expense for the respective observations.
Table 4
Elasticity Estimates for Specific Tax Reforms (OBRA-93 and EGTRRA-JGTRRA 2001-2003) 
Subsets of the overall dataset on Schedule-C business filers are exploited to isolate the short-run effects of the 1993 tax increases
(OBRA-93) and 2001-2003 taxdecreases (EGTRRA & JGTRRA) using the Heckman 2-step Model. Observations appearing in 1992-1994
surround the 1993 tax increases while observations in 2000-2005 surround the gradual tax decreases in 2001-2003. Mean and median
wage bill elasticity estimates for the respective tax increases (1993) and decreases(2001-2003) are reported. The elasticity estimates for
tax increases of 1993 are statistically different than the tax decreases in 2001-2003 for current tax rates but not for future tax rates. The
third column re-states the estimates from Table 2 in the overall model. 
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Table 1.5 
Omitted Variable Bias: The Implications of Omitting Future Tax Rates when 
Modeling the Employment and Wage Bill Responses of Small Businesses to Tax  
Rate Changes 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Least Squares Least Squares
Heckman Heckman Wage Bill >0 Wage Bill >0
Current & Current Current & Current
Independent Variables Future Tax Rates Tax Rates Future Tax Rates Tax Rates
First-Stage (Probit)
Current Tax Rate 1.18*** 5.02*** 1.18*** 5.02***
     (Std. Error) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Future Tax Rate -0.70*** - -0.70*** -
     (Std. Error) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant -2.21*** -2.20*** -2.21*** -2.20***
     (Std. Error) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 402,554 402,554 106,970 106,970
R
2
 (Pseudo-R
2 
)  0.044 0.043 0.096 0.095
Second-Stage (Regression)
Current Tax Rate -7,678.47*** 925.81*** 29.17 3357.63*** 
     (Std. Error) (538.44) (199.6) (50.18) (193.84)
Future Tax Rate 8,707.42*** - 3409.02*** -
     (Std. Error) (491.92) (460.93)
Capital Income 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.11 0.11
     (Std. Error) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08)
Depreciation 0.34*** 0.35*** 1.04*** 1.05***
     (Std. Error) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.13)
Non-Schedule C Business Income 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.01  
     (Std. Error) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Other Businesses: Indicator - - 38.74*** 41,135***
     (Std. Error) (5.13) (5184.39)
Other Business: Farm Indicator - - -27.118*** -26,460***
     (Std. Error) (9.86) (9882)
Constant 2,811,514*** 2,796,106*** 14,573 15,623
     (Std. Error) (137,586) (137,700) (18,373) (18,414)Observations
Correlation Coefficient (ρ) -0.95 -0.95 0 0
Likelihood Ratio 20,289 19,988
Observations 402,554 402,554 106,970 106,970
Note: All std. errors are robust or adjusted standard errors depending on which is appropriate. (***) indicated significance at 0.01%, (**)
indicates significance at 5% and (*) denotes significance at 10%. The correlation coefficient is reported in Columns 1 and 2 for the Heckman.
least squares assumes a correlation coefficient=0 when a probit model is estimated for the first stage - the probit estimates are identical to the
first stage in the corresponding Heckman models. 
Table 4 compares a Heckman model with both current and future tax rates to a Heckman model with only current tax rates in
Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Including only current tax rates biases the marginal effect on employing labor upwards in the
first stage, as shown in Column 2 where a 1 percentage point change in current tax rates implies firms are 5.02% more likely to
employ outside labor. Excluding the future tax variable results in a positive coefficient in the second stage for the wage bill,
instead of the negative coefficient found in Column 1. Marginal effects and coefficients for the other independent variables
change little when future tax rates are excluded. Columns 3 reports the least squares regression using both future and current
tax rates and Column 4 is identical to Column 3 but excludes future tax rates. Column 4 is most similar to the methodology
employed by previous authors where the first stage is a probit model that is independent from the second stage least squares
regression on only observations with positive wage bills. The bias occurs from estimating the entire behavioral effect as
contemporaneous instead of decomposing the response to account for the anticipatory effect as well. Omitting future tax rates
as an explanatory variable induces an omitted variable bias that skews the interpretation of only the coefficients and marginal
effects of interest. 
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Table 1.6 
Specification Testing: Comparison of Heckman Estimates to Other Specifications 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman OLS OLS on Positve
2nd-Stage Tobit All Observations Wage Bill >0
Independent Variables Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
Current Tax Rate -7,678.47*** 6,810.47*** 575.86*** 29.17
     (Std. Error) (538.44) (493.2) (168.71) (50.18)
Future Tax Rate 8,707.42*** -2,391.15*** 649.14*** 3,409.02***
     (Std. Error) (491.92) (399.64) (161.00) (460.93)
Capital Income 0.22*** -1.08*** 0.024 0.11
     (Std. Error) (0.01) (2.26) (0.02) (0.08)
Depreciation 0.34*** 1.34*** 0.76*** 1.04***
     (Std. Error) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13)
Non-Schedule C Business Income 0.03*** -0.02*** -0.003 0.01
     (Std. Error) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Other Businesses: Indicator - 70.113*** 12.33*** 38.74***
     (Std. Error) - (4.35) (2.05) (5.13)
Other Business: Farm Indicator - 79.321*** 6.00** -27.118***
     (Std. Error) - (6.68) (3.05) (9.86)
Constant 2,811,514*** -1,841,021*** 2,540 14,573
     (Std. Error) (137,586) (89,067) (4,577) (18,373)Observations
Correlation Coefficient (ρ)* -0.95 1 - 0
Likelihood Ratio 20,289 -1,721,643
R
2   
0.044 0.006 0.066 0.096
Observations 402,554 402,554 402,554 106,970
     Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity -0.170 0.148 0.013 0.001
Median Elasticity -0.637 0.521 0.046 0.002
     Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity 0.178 -0.051 0.014 0.072
Median Elasticity 0.647 -0.192 0.051 0.265
Note: All std. errors are robust or adjusted standard errors depending on which is appropriate. (***) indicated significance at 0.01%, (**) indicates
significance at 5% and (*) denotes significance at 10%. The correlation coefficient is reported in Column 1 for the Heckman, the Tobit assumes a
correlation coefficient of 1 and truncated OLS used in previous studies assumes a correlation coefficient=0 when a probit model is estimated for the
first stage - the probit estimates are identical to the first stage in the Heckman model, refer to Table 2 to review. Elasticities are average point-estimates
that use the mean or median wage bill for the respective observations. The pseudo-log likehood is reported for the Tobit instead of the likelihood ratio
in Column 2.
Column 1 re-states the second-stage estimates from the Heckman results reported in Table 2. Columns 2-4 present results from different
specifications of the model. Current and Future tax rate coefficients are reported in dollars and all other dollar denomiated variables are
reported in $100,000s. Columns 3 and 4 show the results from a standard OLS regression on all observations, even those not employing
labor and an OLS regression on only observations employing labor, the latter is the specification used in past research. Truncated OLS
does not account for any correlation between the employment and salary expense decisions. Standard OLS shows the mean effect of
increasing tax rates on the entire population regardless of if an observation employs labor or not. Mean and median elasticities are
reported for each specification. In Columns 1 and 2, we see that the additional restrictions added by the Tobit model lead to a reverse in
signs for the elasticity estimates. Additional controls for the number of dependents, marital status and property taxes are used in all
model specifications. The Wald Test is reported for the Heckman specification and is significant at 0.01%. The Tobit model is nested in
the Heckman 2-Step; a Likelihood Ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the Heckman is the true model at 0.01%.
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Figure 1.1 –The Effect of Tax Changes on Firm’s Demand for Labor 
Figure 1.1 displays the optimal owner-effort and labor choices for any given sole 
proprietorship. The value of the marginal product of owner effort is denoted by the 
downward sloping curve labeled MP(e). The two full upward sloping curves represent the 
after-tax marginal cost of owner effort under no taxes and then the critical tax rate (tc). 
The upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0) curve represents owners who only exert managing 
effort, have zero labor effort, and employ outside labor. The horizontal axis measures the 
total amount, or quantity, of owner-effort exerted through managing effort and labor 
effort. The shadow price of owner effort is listed on the vertical axis.  
Case 1: Firms with zero wage bills may employ outside labor after a tax 
increase due to the relative price increase of owner-effort as a productive input. For any 
given firm, there exists a critical tax rate (tc) such that t > tc implies L > 0. There is also a 
second critical tax rate (t0) such that t > t0 implies eL = 0. As long as eL > 0, the firm 
owner simply equates his marginal products of managing effort and labor effort [MP(em) 
= MP(eL)] during maximization. But if L > 0, the owner equates the marginal product of 
his labor effort with the competitive wage because his labor effort and outside labor are 
perfect substitutes [MP(eL) = w]. It follows that there is a range of tax rates over which 
all shifts of the after-tax marginal cost curve can cause a one-for-one substitution of 
managing effort for labor effort (em for eL). Once t0 is exceeded, the owner does not exert 
any labor effort; he equates his marginal cost of managing with the marginal product of 
managing: eL = 0 and MC(e) = MC(em) = MP(em) > w. 
Case 2: Firms with positive wage bills prior to tax increases are denoted by the 
upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0)  curve. The firm owners only exert managing effort and 
upon tax increases, the marginal cost of managing effort increases and owners spend less 
time managing. Henceforth, all changes in employment and output are due to the scale 
effect of reduced effort which reduces production. After the tax increase, the business 
owner reduces his demand for outside labor, ceteris paribus.  
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Figure 1.2 – Wage Bill Kernel Density Estimate 
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Figure 1.3 – Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 1992-1994 
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Figure 1.4 – Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 2001-2005 
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Figure 1.5 - Historical Tax Brackets and Tax Rates 
1988-1990*
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over
15.0% $0 $29,750 15.0% $0 $34,000 15.0% $0 $36,900
28.0% $29,750 $71,900 28.0% $34,000 $82,150 28.0% $36,900 $89,150
33.0% $71,900 $149,250 31.0% $82,150 - 31.0% $89,150 $140,000
28.0% $149,250 - 36.0% $140,000 $250,000
39.6% $250,000 -
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over
15.0% $0 $45,200 10.0% $0 $12,000 10.0% $0 $14,000
27.5% $45,200 $109,250 15.0% $12,000 $46,700 15.0% $14,000 $56,800
30.5% $109,250 $166,500 27.0% $46,700 $112,850 25.0% $56,800 $114,650
35.5% $166,500 $297,350 30.0% $112,850 $171,950 28.0% $114,650 $174,700
39.1% $297,350 - 35.0% $171,950 $307,050 33.0% $174,700 $311,950
38.6% $307,050 - 35.0% $311,950 -
*Income ranges are listed for the first year and are adjusted for inflation in consecutive years.
Income BracketsIncome Brackets
Income Brackets
1991-1992* 1993-2000*
2003-2005*2002
Income Brackets
2001
Personal Income Tax Brackets 1988-2005 for Married filing Jointly
Income Brackets
Income Brackets
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Figure 1.6 – Anticipated Tax Brackets and Tax Rates 2001-2010 
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over
0.0% $0 $26,350 10.0% $0 $12,000 10.0% $0 $14,300 10.0% $0 $14,000
15.0% $26,350 $63,550 15.0% $12,000 $46,700 15.0% $14,300 $58,100 15.0% $14,000 $56,800
28.0% $63,550 $132,600 27.0% $46,700 $112,850 26.0% $58,100 $117,250 25.0% $56,800 $114,650
31.0% $132,600 $208,350 30.0% $112,850 $171,950 29.0% $117,250 $178,650 28.0% $114,650 $174,700
36.0% $208,350 $288,351 35.0% $171,950 $307,050 34.0% $178,650 $319,100 33.0% $174,700 $311,950
39.6% $288,351 - 38.6% $307,050 - 37.6% $319,100 - 35.0% $311,950 -
*Income ranges are listed for the first year only.
Tax Rates 2006-2010
Income Brackets
Proposed Changes in Tax Rates 2001-2010 (under EGTRRA 2001) for Married Filing Jointly 
Tax Rate prior to July 1, 2001 Tax Rate July 1, 2001 -2003 Tax Rates 2004-2005
Income Brackets Income Brackets Income Brackets
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ELASTICITY OF TAXABLE BUSINESS INCOME AND THE WELFARE COST 
OF PERSONAL INCOME TAXES ON THE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS OF 
SMALL BUSINESSES 
 
1 Introduction 
The existing small business literature pertaining to income tax changes estimates 
the employment and wage-bill elasticity responses of businesses to tax changes. It does 
not estimate or focus on the respective welfare costs of income taxes. The full welfare 
cost of any tax includes many factors; some of which are difficult to quantify. A change 
in the amount of owner-effort exerted affects the firm‟s demand for other productive 
inputs like labor and capital. My analysis focuses on the marginal welfare cost of reduced 
owner-effort and the owner‟s corresponding decrease in demand for outside labor, 
relative to the previous income-tax regime.  
I follow Feldstein‟s (1999) approach that proves the elasticity of taxable income is 
a sufficient statistic for measuring the marginal welfare cost of an income tax change. I 
estimate the marginal welfare cost of reduced owner-effort and the corresponding 
reduction in reported taxable business income using the elasticity of taxable business 
income for small business employers. The elasticity of taxable business income is a 
sufficient statistic in estimating the marginal welfare cost of changes in taxable business 
income with respect to tax changes.
59
 The elasticity of taxable business income measures 
                                               
59 As a sufficient statistic, the elasticity of taxable business income accounts for the owner‟s opportunity 
cost (leisure) and changes in owner-effort exerted in the business of interest. The elasticity of taxable 
business income also encompasses changes in reported business expenses, revenues and deductions. 
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the long-run annual incremental cost of a permanent income-tax increase relative to the 
previous income tax regime.  
Small business employers also demand less outside labor when the owner exerts 
less effort in the firm. When the demand for outside labor declines, displaced small 
business employees enter a state of unemployment. All displaced labor in unemployment 
must be absorbed by the rest of the economy before the new long-run equilibrium is 
reached. I also estimate this short-run one-time cost of displaced labor because it is not 
included in the estimate for the elasticity of taxable business income.  
First, I estimate the long-run annual welfare cost of the 1993 and 2001-2003 
personal income tax reforms using the elasticity of taxable business income in a 
difference-in-difference analysis similar to the one performed by Feldstein (1995). I use 
the cross-sectional NBER Public Use file on Schedule C filers (sole-proprietors) for the 
years surrounding each tax reform.
60
 This elasticity of taxable business income implies 
that the marginal welfare cost of the 1993 reform is $920 million and the cost of the 
2001-2003 reforms is $245 million. I am able to provide a lower-bound for these costs 
using the median current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity estimate from the existing literature. 
The current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity can serve as a proxy for the elasticity of owner-
effort. This is the best estimate available for the elasticity of owner-effort which is just 
one component of Feldstein‟s (1995) overall estimate for the elasticity of taxable 
                                               
60 The NBER dataset is identical to the dataset used in Player 2011. 
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income.
61
 The wage-bill elasticity proxy implies a lower-bound of $168 million for the 
1993 reform and $21.4 million for the 2001-2003 reforms.  
To estimate the welfare cost of displaced small business labor, I utilize current-tax 
rate wage-bill elasticity estimates for the respective tax reforms from Player (2011).
62
 
This cost is not zero because of unemployment search costs, labor market frictions, and 
because the labor-supply curve is not perfectly inelastic.
63
 Because this cost applies to all 
displaced workers, it could be quite large depending on the number of workers 
unemployed. I estimate the instantaneous cost of displaced labor to be $10 million for the 
1993 reforms and $3.2 million for the 2001-2003 tax reforms. The lower-bound for both 
of these estimates is zero which would be the relevant welfare cost when displaced labor 
is costlessly absorbed by the rest of the economy.  
  
2 Income Tax Background 
In 1992, Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton campaigned on a promise to raise 
taxes on the wealthiest Americans. In the aftermath of Clinton‟s election, the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA-93) was signed into law. OBRA-93 increased 
personal income taxes on Americans reporting adjusted gross incomes in excess of 
                                               
61 The elasticity of effort is very difficult to quantify but the current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity from Player 
(2011) provides a robust estimate for the scale effect that Schedule C employers undertake in response to 
tax rate changes. The estimate provides a valid proxy so long as owner-effort and outside labor change 
proportionally with respect to income-tax changes.  
62 Theoretically, the total cost of transition includes two parts: the instantaneous cost of displaced labor plus 
the costs required for labor to be gradually absorbed by other sectors to eventually reach a new long-run 
equilibrium. I focus on the instantaneous cost because my data provide reliable estimates for the cost and 
because estimating the absorption path depends on many of the parameters estimated in the labor and 
unemployment duration literature. However, the estimates for the needed parameters vary across studies 
and depend on many factors beyond the scope of this analysis. 
63 If the supply of labor is perfectly inelastic, the welfare cost of the tax increase is zero because labor 
instantly accepts a lower wage and is not displaced.  
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$140,000.
64
 Married taxpayers filing jointly with AGI greater than $250,000 faced 
statutory tax rates of 39.6% instead of 31%. Those with AGI greater than $140,000 but 
less than $250,000 faced a statutory tax rate of 36% instead of the previous 31%. The 
1993 tax reforms only affected the top-income filers and could have been expected with 
confidence months in advance.
65
 
Whereas OBRA-93 increased tax rates, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) lowered personal income-tax rates for most 
taxpayers. Tax-rate decreases were expected to phase-in gradually through 2006. Rates 
initially decreased to 39.1% from 39.6% for the top tax-bracket and were scheduled to 
decline gradually to 35% over five years.
66
 In general, each bracket rate decreased by half 
of a percentage-point in each year. In an attempt to stave off recession, Congress and 
President Bush passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) in 
May 2003. JGTRRA sped up the tax decreases previously scheduled for 2006 to 
retroactively take effect in the 2003 tax year.
67
  
 
 
 
                                               
64  OBRA-93 also repealed the cap on Medicare taxes, increased the taxable portion of social security 
benefits, limited itemized deductions, increased Federal fuel taxes and expanded the Earned Income-tax 
Credit (EITC). 
65 The 1993 tax hikes were most likely anticipated in 1992 because the Clinton campaign focused on 
increasing taxes on the top 1% of taxpayers (defined as AGI greater than $139,999). Furthermore, recent 
research comparing treasury bonds with tax-exempt treasury bonds proposes that markets anticipate tax 
changes often years in advance quite accurately. Poterba (1986) and Kochin and Parks (1998) provide two 
independent studies. For a complete discussion, reference the literature on expected future tax-rates and 
tax-exempt bonds. 
66 See Figures 1 and 2 for comparison of anticipated and actual tax rates. 
67 See Figure 1 for all relevant statutory tax rate changes.  
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3 Past Literature 
 An income tax affects the production mix and tax-preparation of small businesses 
in many ways. Business owners may reduce their own effort, and reduce their demand 
for, and input-mix of, other productive inputs. A business owner may stop production and 
shut-down operations entirely. Additionally, they may try to reduce their taxable business 
income using legal write-offs and deductions (tax-avoidance) or illegal misreporting (tax-
evasion). Any deviation from the optimal production amount and mix due to taxation is a 
welfare cost borne by society.  
Researchers must identify the relevant counterfactual state-of-the-world to 
accurately analyze the welfare changes given a tax increase. Harberger (1964) frames the 
most prominent welfare cost approach; he measures the deadweight loss associated with 
an economy in any given nonoptimal position rather than assuming the economy is in a 
Pareto-optimal position before the distortion. 
Feldstein (1999) proves that the elasticity of taxable income is a sufficient statistic 
to measure the excess burden of income taxation. He shows that researchers can identify 
the single elasticity estimate rather than focusing on all of the channels through which 
taxes affect behavior (e.g. hours, effort, training, evasion and avoidance). Feldstein 
(1995) employs a difference-in-difference analysis on a panel of Form 1040 tax filers to 
estimate the elasticity of taxable income. He concludes that the welfare cost of an income 
tax is possibly as high as $3 per $1 of tax revenue raised for high-income individuals.
68
 
                                               
68 High-income is defined as tax-filing households with adjusted gross income in excess of $250,000. 
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 Although the elasticity of taxable income is a sufficient statistic for welfare cost 
analysis, Chetty (2008) argues it overestimates the excess burden of taxation. He shows 
that some of the tax-avoidance behavior may be quantifiable shifts to other taxable areas 
of the economy. Additionally, he argues that individuals may overestimate the true costs 
of tax-evasion and tax-avoidance. Rather than focusing only on the elasticity of taxable 
income, Chetty‟s welfare cost analysis is a weighted-average of the taxable income 
elasticity and the total earned-income elasticity with respect to changing tax rates. 
Income-shifting to other taxable bases probably occurs less for businesses because 
business income has fewer margins for adjustment than adjusted gross income and is a 
subset of adjusted gross income.  
 My analysis focuses on taxable business income which is one element of total 
taxable income, and hence one component of the elasticity of taxable income. Many 
authors have shown the elasticity of taxable income to be larger for individuals with 
relatively high incomes and with positive business income.
69
 Business income and asset 
allocation are also significantly affected by personal income taxes. Feldstein (1976) 
shows that marginal tax rates have a substantial effect on the shares of portfolios invested 
in different types of assets. Although high-income individuals are often business owners, 
the contribution of business income to the overall income elasticity estimate has not yet 
been studied. This in an interesting area considering politicians typically care about small 
business employment and small business contributions to economic growth. 
                                               
69 The empirical literature on individual taxpayers has found the excess burden of taxation to be large for 
income-earners in the top-percentile but relatively low for the rest of the income distribution. For a few 
examples, refer to Lindsey 1987, Slemrod 1998, Gruber and Saez 2002, Saez 2004. 
61 
 
Additionally, business income is known to constitute a large portion of adjusted 
gross income. Feldstein calculates that 25% of adjusted gross income for individuals over 
$200,000 is from unincorporated business cash flows and the percentage increases with 
higher levels of income. I isolate the elasticity of taxable business income to show that 
business income may be a large and elastic component of the overall measure for the 
elasticity of taxable income.
70
 It seems that a substantial proportion of the behavioral 
response to a tax change occurs at the business income margin rather than other margins 
like wages, exemptions and personal deductions.
71
 
 The existing empirical literature on small business tax-behavior estimates the 
wage-bill elasticity with respect to current and future tax changes. The existing literature 
does not provide marginal welfare cost estimates or policy implications (Carroll et. al 
2000a LaLumia 2008, Player 2011). This paper offers such an estimate.  
 My welfare analysis includes an estimate for the cost of labor displaced from the 
small business sector. The existing literature on unemployment duration and 
unemployment benefits is vast and robust. I will simply review the theoretical 
foundations and highlight several papers that are applicable to my study in the areas of 
unemployment duration and unemployment insurance.   Unemployment insurance 
makes unemployed workers less likely to accept any given position and is a contributing 
factor to unemployment duration. Because of unemployment insurance, workers who are 
                                               
70 Giertz (2009) makes one of the few attempts to forecast tax revenues using the elasticity of taxable 
income. He forecasts the impact of the Bush Tax Cut expiration in January 2011. Using various measures 
of the elasticity of taxable income he predicts revenue collections will be between 12-62% less than the 
mechanical revenue calculation when behavior does not change. The major driver of this result is the fact 
that the Bush Tax Cuts affect every tax bracket and not just the upper income brackets. 
71 This suggests either the supply of owner-effort is very elastic or that the level of reported business 
income is relatively easy to manipulate, or a combination of both. 
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laid-off experience a net loss in income that is less than the full decline in wages. 
Henceforth, workers will be less likely to accept a new position when they are still 
eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Welch (1977) and Ham et al. (1987) find a 
positive relationship between unemployment compensation and unemployment duration. 
Nickell (1979) estimates the probability of any given worker leaving unemployment for a 
given state, conditional on being unemployed. He finds this probability increases when 
unemployment benefits expire or are about to expire. In addition to unemployment 
insurance, mobility costs and job-search costs also contribute to unemployment duration. 
Diamond (1981) focuses on mobility costs while Salant (1997) focuses on the costs of 
searching and matching.    
 
4 Data 
 Data come from the NBER Public Use File on Individual Income-tax Returns 
from 1992 and 1994 and 2000 and 2004. Each year of data provides a 10% stratified 
random sample of unaudited and unamended tax returns. High-income households are 
oversampled and there are no missing values in the dataset
72
. All upper-income returns 
that are sampled at greater than 10% are sub-sampled at 10% to further protect taxpayer 
identity.
73
 Cross-sectional data capture population changes over time and avoid the 
                                               
72
 For each year, all of the extreme value AGI filers are not included in the sample because there would be a 
10% chance of selection for each filer. 
73 For all filers with AGI greater than $200,000 several codes are completely removed: State Codes, 
Alimony Paid/Received, and State Sales Tax Deduction. This applies to roughly 25% of firms employing 
labor and 6% of firms without labor. Marital Status and number of dependents are also modified. For high 
AGI filers, returns are further modified: the Schedule C fields for salaries and wages, state income-taxes, 
and real estate taxes are blurred by multivariate blurred when two of the three categories have nonzero 
numbers. Multivariate blurring is applied to each of the three categories after sub-grouping, the observation 
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survival bias and mean-reversion associated with a balanced panel.
74
 As shown in Figures 
2.3 and 2.4, the distribution of Schedule C employers is changing over time with many 
entities dropping out of the Schedule C filing status. This can be due to reclassifying as 
another flow-through entity or discontinuing the firm‟s operations. Theoretically, 
taxpayers in the cross-sectional model represent different taxpayers over the years but 
they are assumed to behave identically, which is consistent with past empirical tax 
research.  
My analysis will focus on Schedule C data and taxpayer characteristics.
75
 The 
data reported on a Schedule C include the aggregate revenues, expenses and net income 
from the business endeavors of sole-proprietors.
76
 Schedule C filers can, and legally 
should, include “odd-job” income from individuals without formal business names or 
practices. In 2007, 23.1 million returns included a Schedule C filing.
77
 Schedule C 
entities represent about 70% of all IRS documented businesses over 1988-2007.
78
  
Taxpayers receiving social-security income are dropped from the dataset because 
potential retirees may alter reported business income differently when faced with tax 
                                                                                                                                            
is averaged with the two observations closest to it and then the field is replaced with the average value. It is 
important to remember than one observation never contains the full content of the return and often includes 
data from more than one return. 
74 Feldstein (1995) uses a balanced panel of taxpayers appearing in both 1985 and 1988. Tracking 
individuals over time has benefits but I will show that the distribution of Schedule C filers, particularly 
employers, is changing dramatically over my time-horizon. 
75 Schedule C data have limited personal characteristic variables; however, the data are rich in income and 
expense variables.  
76 Schedule C does not include data for S-Corporations and some LLCs. Single member Limited Liability 
Corporations (LLCs) can elect to file a Schedule C. In 2005, of the Schedule C filers, roughly 450,000 were 
registered LLCs.  Multi-member LLCs are type of partnership and file a Schedule E under Partnership 
Income. 
77
 If a taxpayer owns several businesses, a Schedule C is filed separately for each business. 
78
 C-corporations are included in the aggregate IRS business filings. The number of C-corporations drops 
from about 12% in 1988 to 5.8% of all filers in 2007. The number of S-corporations rises from 6.6% to 
12.5% for 1988 and 2007, respectively. 
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changes than non-retirees.
79
 Observations with positive AMT
80
 liabilities are excluded 
because they face different marginal and statutory tax rates than peer filers.
81
 I include 
loss-entities in my sample because the losses are probably not random and contain 
information valuable to the analysis. This is particularly true if reporting a loss-entity 
becomes more attractive because of higher statutory tax rates.
82
  
4a  Data: Summary Statistics 1992 and 1994 
Unweighted selected summary statistics for the Schedule C employers
83
 are 
presented in Table 2.1a for 1992 and 1994 and Table 2.1b for 2000 and 2004. Referring 
to Table 2.1a, the average statutory tax rate for employers in 1992 is 20.6% and in 1994 
is 23.03%.
85
 Whereas the average statutory tax rate rose due to the 1993 tax reforms, 
taxable business income fell. Small business employers report average taxable business 
income of $183,362 in 1992 and $178,917 in 1994.  
Not surprisingly, Schedule C employers report much higher overall adjusted gross 
incomes than the average population. The mean and median AGI for the 1992 sample are 
$233,561 and $103,332, respectively. The mean and median AGI for the 1994 sample are 
$215,134 and $102,799, respectively. On average, it appears that changes in taxable 
business income account for roughly one-quarter of the changes in AGI reported over this 
                                               
79 Approximately 4,000 observations are omitted in each year. This is consistent with the literature; leisure 
may be less costly to retirees than non-retirees, in which case they will respond more acutely to small tax 
rate changes.  
80 AMT stands for “Alternative Minimum Tax”: approximately 2000 observations in each year, or 6% of 
the sample used, are deleted because of the AMT. 
81 Taxpayers with AMT liabilities pay a flat-tax and do not pay the statutory rates listed in the IRS tax 
tables. 
82 Omitting loss-entities may be more convenient when estimating elasticities because the data can be easily 
transformed into natural logarithms; however, I prefer to keep the information contained in that data and 
use levels. 
83 I define an employer as a Schedule C filer with a positive wage bill. 
85 All dollar figures are adjusted for inflation and stated in 2005 real dollars. 
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period.
86
 Adjustments in taxable business income may be one important way Schedule C 
employers are able to reduce their reported AGI and income-tax liability. 
Mean gross receipts for Schedule C employers also decline between the two 
years. In 1992 mean gross receipts are $1,451,427 and in 1994 they are $1,255,608. The 
average wage bill for employers declined over the time period as well. It is $242,074 in 
1992 and $200,589 in 1994. Conversely, self-employment income for employers rose to 
$42,952 in 1994 from $39,987 in 1992. 
In the 1992 sample, approximately 75.84% of owners report at least some of the 
business proceeds as self-employment income. This percentage rises to 78.26% in 2004. 
Schedule C filers employing labor account for roughly 29.88% of all Schedule Cs filed 
with the IRS in 1992 and 1994. 
4b  Data: Summary Statistics 2000 and 2004 
Referencing Table 2.1b, the average statutory tax rate for employers is 25% in 
2000 and is 19.94% in 2004. Employers report average taxable business income of 
$202,045 in 2000 and $190,027 in 2004. Although average taxable business income 
declined over the period, average AGI rose. The mean and median AGI for the 2000 
sample are $633,431 and $150,216, respectively. The mean and median AGI for the 2004 
sample are $782,642 and $115,622, respectively. Mean gross receipts for Schedule C 
employers in 2000 are $1,921,972 and in 2004 are $2,087,495.  
                                               
86 The total change in taxable business income is $4,445 ($183,362 in 1992, less $178,917 in 1994) and the 
total change in AGI is $18,427 ($233,561 in 1992, less $215,134 in 1994). 
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The average wage bill for employers rose over the time period. It is $293,102 in 
2000 and $338,154 in 2004. Conversely, self-employment income for employers declined 
to $43,939 in 2004 from $48,482 in 2000. In the 2000 sample, approximately 76% of 
owners report at least some of the business proceeds as self-employment income. This 
percentage dips to 70.39% in 2004. Schedule C filers employing labor account for 
roughly 25% of all Schedule Cs filed with the IRS in 2000 and 2004. 
4c  Data: Literature Estimates 
Player (2011) uses the same NBER Public Use File for 1992-1994 and 2000-2004 
to estimate a Heckman selection model for the small business wage-bill elasticity with 
respect to changes in statutory tax rates. I utilize the Player (2011) current-tax rate wage-
bill elasticity estimates as a lower-bound in my elasticity of taxable business income 
analysis. I rely on the Player (2011) wage-bill elasticity estimates again to estimate the 
short-run cost of taxation before labor is absorbed by other sectors of the economy.  
For the 1993 and 2001-2003 reforms, Player (2011) estimates the median current-
tax rate wage-bill elasticity to be -0.47 and -0.27, respectively. The difference between 
the two reforms could be due to the different natures of the reforms or a selection bias 
over time. Chetty (2011) argues there are optimization frictions to changing one‟s 
behavior in response to tax reforms. For small rate changes, like those in 2001-2003, 
behavioral changes are relatively costly, ceteris paribus, compared to behavioral changes 
in response to the sharp tax increases in 1993. Additionally, the fixed costs of changing 
one‟s behavior in response to tax changes could be sufficiently large that the small 
changes in the 2001-2003 reforms did not warrant substantial action. This is particularly 
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true when individuals or businesses must make adjustments in discrete integers. One 
example would be the decision to reduce employment; firms may be more likely to 
reduce employment by one worker rather than by one-minute of work, or even one 
hour.
88
 
Another explanation for the differences between the two reform estimates could 
be a selection bias away from the Schedule C status for businesses. The popularity of the 
S-corporation rose over the time period because successful firms found the limited-
liability structure appealing. The percentage of flow-through entities filing as S-
corporations rose steadily between 1986 through 2004. The rules governing S-
corporations changed under the 1986 tax reforms.
89
 
 
5 Welfare Costs Measures: Elasticity of Taxable Business Income  
 To estimate the long-run annual marginal welfare cost of a tax increase, I rely on 
the elasticity of taxable business income. Feldstein (1995) proves the elasticity of taxable 
income is a sufficient statistic to measure the deadweight-loss of taxation. Assume utility 
is increasing in consumption and decreasing in effort; represented by: U(c,e). Business 
owners produce output X using three inputs: capital, outside labor, and owner-effort; or 
more simply X = f(K, L, e). Capital and labor expenses are tax-deductable business 
expenses but owner effort is not. The owner will be taxed at the same tax rate regardless 
of whether he pays himself a salary or extracts firm profits.  
                                               
88 The median wage bill for employers in 1992 is approximately $242,074 which equates to 5-6 employees 
when one assumes all employees are full-time workers earning the U.S. 1992 median income of $40,500.  
89 The 1986 reforms reduced the filing restrictions on S-corporations, making it easier to incorporate as one. 
See http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=152029,00.html for a full description of S-
corporations and the percentage of flow-through entities filing as S-corporations over time. 
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 Taxable business income is represented by M where M = X – rK – wL. 
Consumption is simply any business income left after taxes are deducted: C = (1-t)M . 
This implies a direct connection between tax changes and changes in owner-effort and 
therefore income from production. The cost of effort is increasing with output, income 
and hence, consumption. I assume that owners are indifferent between exerting effort in 
their firm and working (exerting effort) for someone else, ceteris paribus, because either 
source of income would be taxed at the same tax rate. 
 The major distortion when effort or income is taxed through an income tax is the 
owner‟s shift to the untaxed leisure market.90 Any tax on effort is equivalent to a leisure 
subsidy. A tax increase on business income induces owners to consume more leisure. 
Additionally, higher tax rates may encourage owners to consume more of their salaries 
and profits through tax-deductable expenses like travel, meals and entertainment.
91
 
Increases in tax rates may also encourage owners to shift the timing of their 
compensation to periods with lower expected tax rates, even if such periods are years in 
the future.
92
 Higher tax rates may induce additional misreporting and tax-evasion.  
 The elasticity of taxable business income is the single best measure for welfare 
cost analyses associated with business tax changes. Because of the envelop conditions of 
consumer and firm optimization, the elasticity of taxable business income accounts for all 
                                               
90 Retirees are excluded from the sample used for estimation because their preferences and cost of leisure 
are probably very different from prime age workers. 
91 Additionally, owners can partake in fringe benefits they provide for employees: on-site meals, daycare, 
and expensive health and dental insurance plans. 
92 Some fringe benefits like stock purchasing plans, retirement plans, and deferred compensation, allow 
owners and employees to “time” their compensation. 
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secondary distortions: elasticity of owner effort, elasticity of deductions, and elasticity of 
compensation.  
 Implementing the standard Harberger welfare cost analysis, the welfare cost of an 
income tax is: 
 , 
or for a change in income tax rates, the marginal excess burden of taxation can be 
written:  
      (1) 
Where εTBI represents the elasticity of taxable business income, Δt
2
 represents the squared 
income-tax rate change, and t0 represents the original tax rate.
93
 When owners cannot 
alter their level of deductions or the timing of compensation, the elasticity of taxable 
business income would provide a robust proxy for the elasticity of owner-effort. The 
robustness of the proxy declines as the deductions and timing of compensation become 
increasingly flexible. 
In a one-sector economy the elasticity of taxable business income is the only 
computation necessary to properly estimate the excess burden of a tax change. However, 
in a multiple-sector economy, such as one with differential tax rates on corporate and 
non-corporate income, further analysis may be required. 
 
 
 
                                               
93 Equation 1 is a linear approximation; therefore, discrete and marginal changes are identical because the 
discrete change is equal to the marginal effect multiplied by the change. Also, I am assuming that there is 
no change in the price per unit used to generate income.  
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6  Welfare Cost Estimation: The Elasticity of Taxable Business Income 
The elasticity of taxable business income simply measures the change in reported 
taxable business income associated with a tax change. This is one component of the 
overall measure for the elasticity of taxable income that Feldstein (1995) estimates. The 
elasticity of taxable business income may be upwardly biased and overstate the actual 
welfare loss if business owners can shift assets to other taxable areas in the economy.
94
 
The true marginal welfare cost is the loss associated with the increase in leisure hours and 
assets shifted to less productive untaxed sectors.  
The flexibility of taxable business income depends on many things including the 
flexibility of owner effort, deductions or expenses, the timing of compensation, and 
capital investments. Additionally, the cost of altering one‟s behavior in response to tax 
changes is most likely positive. Unfortunately, owner-effort is not directly observed and 
many of the other flexible factors also depend on tax rates.  
6a  Welfare Cost Estimation: Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
I use the 1992 and 1994, and 2000 and 2004 datasets to directly estimate the 
elasticity of taxable business income for employers. I estimate the respective changes in 
levels for each cross-section and then use the average tax rate change to convert my 
estimates to elasticity form.
95
  
                                               
94 Business owners are probably less likely to shift business income to other taxable bases in the economy 
than nonbusiness owners because business owners are a subset of the overall population and have fewer 
margins to adjust. For a detailed discussion, see Chetty (2011). Business owners could theoretically 
restructure as a C-corporation and stop filing on the individual tax return entirely but this is unlikely past 
1986 because individual tax rates are lower than corporate-tax rates.  
95 My data are rich in income characteristics; unfortunately, all of the variables one would like to include on 
the right-hand side of a regression are either jointly determined with taxable business income or are 
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The 1993 tax reform increased tax rates on individuals with adjusted gross income 
in excess of $140,000. I estimate the elasticity of taxable business income for all small 
business employers and then subtract the estimates for the group of employers who did 
not face any tax changes (Δt=0). This differenced estimate accounts for macroeconomic 
trends over the period. A similar methodology is employed for the 2001-2003 reforms. 
Table 2.2 presents mean and median estimates for the elasticity of taxable 
business income for employers in the two years surrounding the 1993 tax reforms. 
Columns 1-3 summarize the percentage changes in tax rates and taxable business income 
for each level of adjusted gross income (AGI). Top income-earners, employers with AGI 
of $250,000 or more, are denoted “High” in Column 1. Schedule C employers with AGI 
greater than or equal to $140,000 but less than $250,000 in are denoted “Mid” in Column 
2, and those with AGI less than $140,000 are labeled “Low” in Column 3. “Low” small 
business employers did not face any tax changes during the 1993 reforms and provide a 
benchmark for economy-wide trends which will be differenced out in Columns 4 and 5. 
Differencing yields unbiased estimates so long as each group of employers is affected 
equally by the macroeconomic trends.
96
 This is particularly important between 1992 and 
1994 because the “dot-com” boom begins in 1993 and extends through the end of the 
sample period. I want to account for the massive upward trend in production that is 
independent from the tax increases. 
                                                                                                                                            
endogenous. Examples include: depreciation, capital expenses, capital income, the existence of other 
business income, and self-employment income. 
96
 This differencing would not eliminate a bias from business owners shifting income to other taxable bases 
because only owners facing tax changes would shift any income. Chetty (2008) argues the elasticity of 
taxable income overestimates the excess burden of taxation. He shows that some of the tax-avoidance 
behavior may be shifts to other taxable areas of the economy.  
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 Column 4 shows that the elasticity of taxable business income is -3.29 for “High” 
AGI employers and Column 5 shows the estimate is -5.39 for “Mid” AGI employers. 
These estimates reveal that business income is very sensitive to increases in tax rates.
97
 
For comparison, Feldstein‟s (1995) estimate for the overall elasticity of taxable income 
ranges from -0.45 to -1.45 after I convert his net-of-tax elasticity estimates (ranging from 
1.1 to 3.05) to tax-elasticities for comparison.
98
 The elasticity of taxable business income 
for employers is two to six times larger than the elasticity of taxable income for middle 
and high-income taxpayers. 
The elasticity of taxable business income estimates for small business employers 
during the 2001-2003 reforms are presented in Table 2.3. The 2001-2003 reforms 
affected most tax-payers, with the exception of those in the lowest tax-bracket (10% in 
2001 and 15% in 2003). The columns are similar to those presented for the 1993 reforms 
with additional columns for low-AGI employers facing tax changes and low-AGI 
employers not facing tax changes. Small business employers not facing tax rate changes 
are still utilized as a benchmark for economy-wide trends over the period.  
Columns 5-7 of Table 2.3 show the differenced estimates for “High”, “Mid” and 
“Low” AGI employers. In Column 5, employers with AGI greater than or equal to 
$250,000 have an average elasticity of taxable business income of -4.84. In Column 6, 
middle-income employers have a mean estimate of -3.53 and Column 7 shows the 
estimate for “Low” AGI employers to be -1.98.  
                                               
97 Feldstein shows tax rates have substantial impacts on the asset portfolio choices of high-income 
individuals (See Feldstein (1976) and (1997) for an in-depth analysis).  
98 Feldstein‟s (1995) original elasticity estimates are based off of the net-of-tax rate: T = (1-t), instead of 
simply the tax rate. 
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The estimates in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 for the elasticity of taxable business 
income show that regardless of tax increases or decreases, taxable business income 
appears to be very responsive, particularly for high-income taxpayers. The estimates 
range between -3.29 and -5.39 for employers with AGI greater than $140,000 and the 
estimates are even more compact for the 2001-2003 reforms. 
6b Welfare Cost Estimation using the Elasticity of Taxable Business Income 
Now that I have estimates for the elasticity of taxable business income, I use the 
estimates to calculate the change in welfare according to Equation 1: 
   (1) 
I first calculate the welfare change for each individual in my dataset and I then aggregate 
the results for an overall sample estimate. 
Table 2.4 shows the estimates for employers facing statutory tax changes in the 
respective base-year. Small businesses not employing labor and employers not facing tax 
rate changes are not included in any of the calculations. The marginal excess burden of 
taxation is reported per employer in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for the 
base-year sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy. The 
differenced elasticity estimates from Section 6a for low, mid, and high AGI employers 
are utilized to provide a range of estimates for the marginal welfare cost calculation. 
 For the 11,644 observations in 1992, the deadweight-loss per employer falls 
between $7,907 and $12,961 and the total deadweight-loss for employers is $920 million 
for the U.S. economy when the elasticity of taxable business income for high-AGI 
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employers is used (-3.29) and it is $1.5 billion when the elasticity of taxable business 
income for mid-AGI employers is used (-5.39).  
The 2001-2003 reforms are not estimated to be as costly as the 1993 reforms, 
primarily because fewer businesses are electing to classify as a Schedule C entity. The 
per employer marginal welfare cost is estimated to fall between $4,065 and $5,567.
99
 
When I expand the 10% stratified random sample to the U.S. tax-filing population, the 
deadweight-loss for the U.S. economy is $335 million using the elasticity estimate for 
high-AGI employers (-4.84) and $244.5 million for the elasticity estimate for mid-AGI 
employers (-3.53).
100
 
 This is the marginal welfare cost directly associated with reduced owner-effort, 
and scaling back production due to the tax changes. The deadweight-loss from displaced 
labor is not included in this measure. The difference in the magnitudes of the deadweight-
loss is attributed to the decline in the number of Schedule C employers between 1992 and 
2000. If other flow-through entities respond to tax changes in the same manner and 
magnitude as sole-proprietors, the economic losses will be much higher. 
 
7  Robustness Checks using Estimates from the Existing Literature 
After directly estimating the elasticity of taxable business income for each tax 
reform, I compare my estimates with estimates from the existing literature. I first utilize 
                                               
99 I do not specifically mention the “Low AGI” elasticity estimate of -1.98 to maintain consistency with the 
1993 reforms where only tax-payers with AGI in excess of $140,000 experienced any tax rate changes. The 
per employer marginal welfare cost associated with the -1.98 elasticity is $2,273. 
100 As a reference point for the relative magnitudes of the welfare costs (gains), GDP in 1994, 2000, and 
2005 was $8.9 trillion, $11.2 trillion, and $12.6 trillion, respectively. All GDP measures are inflation-
adjusted chained-2005 dollars. Recall that Schedule C filers represent around 70% of all business filers 
from 1988-2007 and small businesses account for “roughly 50% of non-farm GDP each year” (Source: 
www.irs.gov and www.sba.gov, respectively). 
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the current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player (2011) as a proxy for the 
elasticity of taxable business income. This estimate strictly proxies for the elasticity of 
owner-effort and hence, serves as a lower-bound for the elasticity of taxable business 
income.
101
 Secondly, I compare my elasticity of taxable business income estimates to 
Feldstein‟s (1995) estimates for the overall elasticity of taxable income.  
I utilize the current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity to proxy for the elasticity of 
owner-effort or the elasticity of taxable business income. The current-tax rate wage-bill 
elasticity represents the change in a firm‟s scale effect. When firm operations are scaled 
back, business income, or owner-effort will decline proportionally to wages. The validity 
of this proxy relies on the assumption that any change in the demand for outside labor is 
proportional to reductions in owner-effort. Assuming the wage bill and business income 
are affected proportionally when scaling back operations, the wage-bill elasticity 
estimates can be used to proxy for the reduction in taxable income due to reduced 
production; hence, the permanent social loss due to tax changes. Utilizing this measure 
also excludes any income that would still be taxed when it is shifted to another tax-base. 
The Player 2011 wage-bill elasticity applies only to firms employing labor. Non-
employers lack the data needed in the computation because they have wage bills of zero. 
The omission of data on non-employers leads to a downwardly biased proxy for the 
elasticity of owner-effort. The respective median wage-bill elasticities are -0.60 and -0.31 
for the respective 1993 and 2001-2003 tax reforms. These estimates are scale effects and 
                                               
101A proxy for owner-effort would also be appropriate when the elasticity of taxable business income 
includes substantial income shifts to other taxable bases in the economy.  
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report the percentage change, or contraction, in the wage bill when business owners are 
faced with a 1% increase in statutory tax rates.  
Table 2.5 compares my marginal welfare cost estimates from Table 2.4 to the 
corresponding estimates when existing literature estimates are used to proxy for the 
elasticity of taxable business income. All estimates are for employers facing statutory tax 
changes in the respective base-year. The marginal burden of taxation is reported per 
employer (or per firm employing labor) in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for 
the base-year sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy.  
Row III, for both 1992 and 2000, displays the marginal cost estimates when the 
median current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity from Player (2011) is used as the proxy. The 
current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity is the best available estimate for the elasticity of 
owner-effort. Therefore, it can serve as a lower-bound for the marginal cost of taxation if 
the only cost were due to reduced owner-effort. The 1992 per employer estimate of 
$1,443 is much lower than the per employer estimate using the elasticity of taxable 
business income ($7,907). Instead of a lower-bound, I can also think of this estimate as 
isolating the cost of changes on a single margin: owner-effort. In 2000 the estimate is 
$356 per employer for the elasticity of owner-effort. This is dramatically lower than the 
estimate using the elasticity of taxable business income which is approximately $4,000. 
The difference between 1992 and 2000 is most likely due to profitable sole-proprietors 
(Schedule C filers) reclassifying as S-corporations.
102
  
                                               
102 See Figures 3 and 4 for a visual depiction of the Schedule C wage bill data over time. 
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Rows IV and V utilize the estimates for overall taxable income elasticity from 
Feldstein (1995). Hence the per employer cost in Rows IV and V is computed using the 
same data on Schedule C employers but the elasticity estimate for overall income from 
Feldstein (1995). For computation, Feldstein's reported net-of-tax-rate elasticities are first 
converted to tax-elasticities for a proper comparison.
103
 In Row IV, Feldstein‟s “Highest 
AGI” Elasticity of -1.45 yields a welfare cost estimate of $3,476 per employer in 1992 
and $1,662 per employer in 2000. The elasticity estimate corresponds to taxpayers in the 
top-income bracket (AGI≥$250,000). Feldstein‟s estimate is -1.01 for taxpayers with 
AGI between $140,000 and $250,000 and is used in Row V. This proxy implies a 
marginal welfare cost of $2,435 per firm in 1992 and $1,164 in 2000. All comparable 
estimates in Table 2.5 are statistically different from each other.  
 
8 Two-Sector Model of Labor Displacement 
 In a one-sector economy the elasticity of taxable business income is the only 
computation necessary to properly estimate the excess burden of a tax change. However, 
because owners reduce their demand for outside labor given a rise in taxes, there may be 
additional distortions created in markets beyond those included in the envelope theorem 
for the elasticity of taxable business income in a multiple-sector economy.  
 Labor is released from the small business sector and returns to the aggregate labor 
market. The welfare cost of labor‟s transition into other sectors of the economy is not 
                                               
103 Feldstein‟s (1995) net-of-tax-rate elasticity estimates of 1.1, 2.14 and 3.05 are approximately equivalent 
to tax elasticities of -0.43, -1.01 and -1.45 when I use Feldstein‟s data to compute percentage changes in tax 
rates instead of net-of-tax-rates. 
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included in the statistic for the elasticity of taxable business income. However, the costs 
of transitioning displaced labor can be bounded and estimated. At one bound, all of the 
labor is perfectly and costlessly absorbed by other sectors in the economy and there is no 
additional burden of taxation beyond the measure for the elasticity of taxable business 
income. The excess burden of taxation is also zero when labor from the small business 
sector is not suitable for substitution into other sectors, or when the supply of labor is 
perfectly inelastic. In both scenarios, the wage in the small business sector must adjust to 
maintain full employment.
104
 In this scenario, the change in the small business wage bill 
would properly measure the tax-incidence borne by employees. 
 When the aforementioned scenarios do not hold, displaced labor enters 
unemployment and is gradually absorbed by the rest of the economy. This adjustment is 
transitional and is in addition to the costs from the elasticity of taxable business income. 
The theoretical measurement associated with the transition decreases over time from the 
upper-bound in the short-run and then down to the lower-bound (zero) in the long-run 
once the new economy-wide long-run equilibrium is reached. In the short-run, the burden 
of taxation will hug the upper-bound because labor market frictions and job specific 
training delay labor‟s absorption into other sectors. As time passes, unemployment 
benefits end
105
, new training can be undertaken by displaced employees, and firms in 
other sectors have had time to optimally search for new hires. All of these factors push 
                                               
104 Tax incidence is not discussed here but will provide a nice extension once each portion of the total cost 
of taxation is estimated independently. In the case where labor is not substitutable between sectors, 
employees will bear a large portion of an income-tax hike on their employers. 
105 Unless you are one of the unemployed from the Credit Crunch‟s 2008 recession where unemployment 
benefits extend for 99 weeks and you wager that your benefits will be extended further pending the 2012 
elections. 
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the estimate for the additional costs of taxation towards zero in the long-run. Even though 
the point-estimate for the marginal welfare cost in the long-run may be small, the losses 
are very real in the short-run and represent a direct reduction in production and wealth for 
individuals and the economy. Assuming this two-sector economy has no other nonneutral 
taxes, I can estimate the immediate short-run cost of displaced labor.  
8a  Welfare Cost Estimation of Displaced Labor in the Short-run 
Some small businesses layoff labor in response to income-tax increases. This 
displaced labor then enters a state of unemployment. Eventually, the labor will be 
absorbed by other sectors in the economy as the economy approaches a new long-run 
equilibrium. To measure the instantaneous cost of displaced labor, assume no one finds a 
new job in the first period (a week). At this time, the competitive wage has not had time 
to adjust in response to the unemployed labor.  
The initial movement is from labor employed before and after the tax change:    
(L1 – L0) =  . Or,  (L1-L0) =  ∙ ηL,x ∙ εx,t   , where ηL,x  represents 
the elasticity of demand for labor with respect to output, and εx,t represents the semi-
elasticity of output with respect to the tax rate. 
Once the wage adjusts, the amount of labor employed changes again: (L1-L2) = 
 .  
Or,  (L1-L2)  =   ∙ ηL,w , where ηL,w is the elasticity of the demand for labor 
with respect to the wage rate. 
Combining the two, I get: 
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 -WCL =    (2) 
 =  
 =  
 And (   which equals:  ,  which is: 1-εL,t∙ t 
where  is the elasticity of labor with respect to the tax rate. The elasticity of labor with 
respect to the tax rate is estimated by Player (2011). 
 So,  -WCL = t0wL0  t   (3) 
Because the wage rate cannot vary in the short-run,  =0 and the welfare cost reduces 
to: 
 WCL = t0 w L0  , where (w L0) is the bi-monthly wage bill. Utilizing the 
mean and median wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player (2011), I calculate the firm-
level welfare cost for each observation in my 1992-1994 and 2000-2004 samples.  
By definition, in the short-run, any displaced labor has not had time to be 
absorbed by other sectors in the economy and wages have not adjusted. The 
instantaneous cost is the first of the welfare costs associated with the economy‟s 
transition to a new long-run equilibrium. The lower-bound for the short-run cost of 
displaced labor is zero. The cost approaches zero the more quickly and costlessly 
displaced labor is absorbed by the rest of the economy. It also approaches zero as the 
elasticity of supply of outside labor becomes perfectly inelastic.   
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 Table 2.6 displays the sample level marginal welfare cost associated with labor 
displaced from the small business sector due to reduced owner-effort in firms when taxes 
rise. For the 1993 reforms, the per firm (or per employer) cost is around $87 when the 
minimum duration of unemployment is assumed to be two-weeks.
106
 For the 1992 
sample, this loss ranges from $796,822 for the mean wage-bill elasticity, to $1.02 million 
for the median wage-bill elasticity. The per firm welfare cost of the 2001-2003 tax 
decreases is approximately $54. For the entire 2000 sample, the cost is estimated to fall 
between $280,735 for the mean and $322,326 for median wage-bill elasticity.
107
 
Extrapolating to the U.S. tax-filing population, the 10% random sample equates to a 
median cost of $10 million for 1993 reforms and $3.2 million for 2001-2003 reforms.
108
 
 
9 Estimates for the Total Welfare Cost due to Tax Rate Changes on Small 
Businesses 
 To review, the elasticity of taxable business income sufficiently estimates the 
annual long-run incremental cost of a permanent income tax increase on small 
businesses. The elasticity of taxable business income encompasses the costs of changes in 
                                               
106 Table 6 shows the instantaneous cost for the first two-weeks (bi-monthly) when labor is displaced. This 
implicitly assumes a minimum duration of unemployed of two-weeks. The estimates can be easily adjusted 
to account for different assumptions regarding the minimum length of unemployment (one week, one 
month, etc.). 
107 It is difficult to justify isolating the 2001 reforms from the 2003 reforms because the 2001 rate decreases 
were expected to phase-in gradually through 2006. The entire tax rate change for both reforms occurs 
between 2001 and 2003. 
108 A more robust analysis would model and incorporate labor‟s absorption path into other sectors of the 
economy. The dollar estimates from such an analysis would vary dramatically based on the chosen 
magnitudes for variables like unemployment duration, the real interest rate, and expected inflation.  
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owner-effort, business expenses and business deductions.
109
 The short-run or 
instantaneous cost to society when labor is displaced from the small business sector is not 
included in the elasticity of taxable business income. This additional cost occurs when 
employers change the scale of the firm, altering their own effort and demand for outside 
labor.  
Table 2.7 summarizes the main estimates of the paper. The high and low 
estimates for the elasticity of taxable business income come from Table 2.4 which uses 
the elasticity of taxable business income estimates from the 1992 and 2000 data on 
employers facing income-tax changes. The instantaneous cost of displaced labor comes 
from Table 2.6 where the mean and median wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player 
(2011) are utilized to estimate the impact on labor when small business owners alter the 
scale of the firm's operations. The high estimates are from the median wage-bill elasticity 
and the low estimates are from the mean wage-bill elasticity.
110
 The data are a 10% 
stratified random sample; therefore, the cost borne by the economy is simply ten times 
the cost borne in the sample. 
 
10 Conclusion 
I have provided two analyses to estimate the excess burden of taxation on small 
business employers associated with the OBRA-1993 and JGTRRA 2001-2003 tax 
                                               
109
 When a large proportion of the change in taxable business income is due to shifts to other taxable bases 
in the economy, the elasticity of taxable business income will overstate the true welfare cost.  
 
110 The lower-bound for the short-run cost of displaced labor is zero. The cost approaches zero the more 
quickly and costlessly displaced labor is absorbed by the rest of the economy. It also approaches zero as the 
elasticity of the labor supply-curve becomes perfectly inelastic.   
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reforms. The difference-in-difference analysis uses pooled cross-sectional tax return data 
surrounding each respective tax reform to estimate the elasticity of taxable business 
income which can be used to measure the permanent change in welfare. The elasticity of 
taxable business income for the top income-tax bracket is -3.29, and it is -5.39 for 
employers in the next highest tax-bracket in 1992. The estimate for the top income-tax 
bracket is -4.84 in 2000, and it is -3.53 for the next highest tax-bracket. 
Using my elasticity of taxable business income estimates, I calculate the excess 
burden of personal income taxes on small business employers to be $920 million for the 
1993 reforms and $244.5 million for the 2001-2003 reforms. The difference in total 
marginal welfare costs between the 1993 and 2001-2003 reforms is attributed to the 
changing distribution of Schedule C filers over time. 
For robustness, my estimates are compared with estimates from the existing 
literature for the elasticity of owner-effort (Player 2011) and the overall elasticity of 
taxable income (Feldstein 1995). A proxy for the elasticity of owner-effort provides the 
lower-bound for my welfare cost estimates. Secondly, the overall elasticity of taxable 
income (Feldstein 1995) shows that business income does indeed appear to be more 
elastic than other sources of income. This implies tax increases on business income will 
yield little to negative revenue increases and will come with the cost of large deadweight-
losses. For revenue generation, the government may want to target other sources of 
income that are not as elastic.  
I also estimate the cost of displaced labor when employers alter the scale of the 
firm due to taxation. This cost is separate from the welfare cost associated with the 
84 
 
elasticity of taxable business income. When labor supply is perfectly inelastic or 
displaced labor is costlessly absorbed by the rest of the economy, the cost of displaced 
labor is zero. I estimate the instantaneous cost of displaced labor to be $10 million for the 
1993 reforms and $3.2 million for the 2001-2003 reforms. 
Future research could focus on the selection away from the Schedule C, whether 
all flow-through entities respond homogenously to tax changes, and identifying more 
inelastic sources of adjusted gross income.
111
 
                                               
111 Feldstein‟s overall estimate for the elasticity of taxable income is approximately -1.45 which implies 
some income sources must be less elastic than taxable business income. The category “wages, tips and 
salaries” is probably a relatively inelastic source of AGI as evidenced by the many Federal taxes already 
targeting wages: social security, Medicaid/Medicare, etc.  
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Table 2.1a 
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Employers 1992-1994 
Variable 1992 1994
 Tax Rate
       Mean 20.60% 23.03%
       Median 28.00% 28.00%
      (Std. Dev.) (12.28) (14.22)
Taxable Business Income
       Mean $183,362 $178,917
       Median $59,891 $62,908
      (Std. Dev.) ($603,821) ($544,498)
Wage Bill
       Mean $242,074 $200,589
       Median $77,097 $74,720
      (Std. Dev.) ($802,238) ($472,857)
Self-Employment Income
       Mean $39,987 $42,952
       Median $40,357 $46,151
      (Std. Dev.) ($33,709) ($34,523)
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
       Mean $233,561 $215,134
       Median $103,332 $102,799
      (Std. Dev.) ($4,715,579) ($2,258,975)
Gross Receipts (Schedule C) 
       Mean $1,451,427 $1,255,608
       Median $553,019 $522,564
      (Std. Dev.) ($3,632,818) ($2,845,292)
Depreciation 
       Mean $40,972 $34,422
       Median $11,149 $10,516
      (Std. Dev.) ($192,571) ($98,048)
Observations 14,800 7,304
Note: The probability of any Schedule C filer employing labor in 1992 is 
29.88%. In 1994 it is 29.59%. The probability of a Schedule C filer claiming 
self-employment income is 75.84% in 1992 and 78.26% in 1994.
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Table 2.1b 
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Employers 2000-2004 
Variable 2000 2004
 Tax Rate
       Mean 25.00% 19.94%
       Median 28.00% 25.00%
      (Std. Dev.) (14.77) (13.66)
Taxable Business Income
       Mean $202,045 $190,027
       Median $73,407 $51,338
      (Std. Dev.) ($650,114) ($1,110,137)
Wage Bill
       Mean $293,102 $338,154
       Median $103,165 $118,790
      (Std. Dev.) ($989,346) ($834,768)
Self-Employment Income
       Mean $48,482 $43,939
       Median $51,521 $34,126
      (Std. Dev.) ($40,787) ($41,849)
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
       Mean $633,431 $782,642
       Median $150,216 $115,622
      (Std. Dev.) ($3,430,136) ($7,438,947)
Gross Receipts (Schedule C) 
       Mean $1,921,972 $2,087,495
       Median $677,960 $792,138
      (Std. Dev.) ($14,500,000) ($6,342,496)
Depreciation 
       Mean $44,269 $69,877
       Median $10,779 $13,172
      (Std. Dev.) ($166,059) ($262,796)
Observations 7,474 7,380
Note: The probability of any Schedule C filer employing labor in 2000 is 
25.47%. In 2004 it is 24.01%. The probability of a Schedule C filer claiming self-
employment income is 76% in 2000 and 70.39% in 2004.  
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Table 2.1c 
Current Tax Rate Wage-Bill Elasticity 
 
t1 t2
Salary%change(1993)
Salary%change(2001) 1992-1994 2000-2004
Mean Elasticity -0.47 -0.27
Median Elasticity -0.60 -0.31
Current Tax-Rate Wage Bill Elasticity
Note: Estimates are from Player 2011. Elasticities are average
point-estimates that use the mean or median salary expense for
the respective observations. The elasticity estimates for tax
increases of 1993 are statistically different than the tax decreases
in 2001-2003. 
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Table 2.2 
The Elasticity of Taxable Business Income with respect to Statutory Tax Rates for 
 Schedule C Employers for the 1993 Reforms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High Mid Low
AGI≥ $140,000 and High - Low Mid - Low
AGI≥ $250,000 AGI < $250,000 AGI < $140,000 (1)-(3) (2)-(3)
% Change in Tax Rate
     Mean 24.36% 14.93% 0.00% - -
     Median 24.36% 14.93% 0.00% - -
% Change Taxable Business Income
     Mean 2.39% 2.05% 82.47% -80.08% -80.42%
     Median -5.08% -2.28% 7.31% -12.39% -9.59%
Observations (1992) 3,410 1,300 10,090
Observations (1994) 1,449 739 5,116
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
       Mean -3.29 -5.39
       Median -0.51 -0.64
Note: High AGI represents employers with adjusted gross income greater than or equal to $250,000 in chained-inflation adjusted 2005 dollars. Mid 
AGI represents employers with AGI under $250,000 and greater than or equal to $140,000. Low AGI represents employers with AGI below $140,000. 
For the 1993 reforms, taxpayers with AGI < $140,000 did not face any tax rate changes. This does not include individuals facing a 0% statutory tax 
rate.
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Table 2.3 
The Elasticity of Taxable Business Income with respect to Statutory Tax Rates  
for Schedule C Employers for the 2001-2003 Reforms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mid
High AGI≥ $140,000 and Low No Tax Rate High - No Change Mid - No Change Low - No Change
AGI≥ $250,000 AGI < $250,000 AGI < $140,000 Change (1)-(4) (2)-(4) (3)-(4)
% Change in Tax Rate
     Mean -12.33% -8.70% -12.30% 0.00% - -
     Median -12.33% -8.70% -11.32% 0.00% - -
% Change Taxable Business Income
     Mean 23.93% -5.03% -11.47% -35.77% 59.70% 30.74% 24.30%
     Median 11.17% -5.26% 2.66% -1.64% 12.81% -3.63% 4.29%
Observations (2000) 2,190 819 3,007
Observations (2004) 2,091 436 2,670
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
       Mean -4.84 -3.53 -1.98
       Median -1.04 0.42 -0.38
Note: High AGI represents employers with adjusted gross income greater than or equal to $250,000 in chained-inflation adjusted 2005 dollars. Mid AGI represents employers with AGI under $250,000 and greater 
than or equal to $140,000. Low AGI represents employers with AGI below $140,000 but not in the lowest tax bracket because the lowest tax bracket did not have a rate reduction. Column 4 includes employers not 
facing any tax rate changes with AGI below $140,000. This does not include individuals facing a 0% statutory tax rate.  
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Table 2.4  
Welfare Cost of Tax Reforms on Small Business Employers using Elasticity of Taxable Business Income Estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
     Estimate for "High AGI" = 3.29 $7,907 $92,065,786 $920,657,856
     Estimate for "Mid AGI" =  5.39 $12,961 $150,917,514 $1,509,175,141
Observations 11,644
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy
    Estimate for "High AGI" = 4.84 $5,567 $33,489,665 $334,896,648
     Estimate for "Mid AGI" =  3.53 $4,065 $24,452,476 $244,524,762
     Estimate for "Low AGI" =  1.98 $2,273 $13,671,684 $136,716,840
Observations 6,016
Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
Welfare Cost: 1992 
Welfare Cost: 2000
Table 4 shows the change in welfare cost from each tax reform which is computed using the Harberger analysis in
Equation 1, Section 5. The estimates are for employers facing statutory tax changes in the respective base year (not for
small businesses not employing labor or employers not facing tax rate changes). The marginal excess burden of taxation
is reported per employer (or per firm employing labor) in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for the base-year
sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy in the base year. The differenced elasticity
estimates for low to mid to high AGI employers are utilized to provide a range of estimates in the marginal welfare cost
calculation.
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Table 2.5 
Lower-Bound Estimation and Robustness Checks using Literature Estimates 
(1) (2) (3)
Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
I.      Estimate for "High AGI" = 3.29 $7,907 $92,065,786 $920,657,856
II.      Estimate for "Mid AGI" =  5.39 $12,961 $150,917,514 $1,509,175,141
Lower-Bound & Robustiness Checks
III.     Current-Tax Rate Wage-Bill Elasticity $1,443 $16,805,785 $168,057,852
IV.     Feldstein "Highest AGI" Elasticity $3,476 $40,473,933 $404,739,327
V.     Feldstein "High AGI" Elasticity $2,435 $28,348,559 $283,485,587
Observations 11,644
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy
I.     Estimate for "High AGI" = 4.84 $5,567 $33,489,665 $334,896,648
II.      Estimate for "Mid AGI" =  3.53 $4,065 $24,452,476 $244,524,762
Lower-Bound & Robustiness Checks
III.     Current-Tax Rate Wage-Bill Elasticity $356 $2,144,458 $21,444,584
IV.     Feldstein "Highest AGI" Elasticity $1,662 $9,995,943 $99,959,433
V.     Feldstein "High AGI" Elasticity $1,164 $7,001,311 $70,013,109
Observations 6,016
Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
Welfare Cost: 1992 
Welfare Cost: 2000
Table 5 compares my marginal welfare cost estimates from Table 4 to the corresponding estimates if other estimates are used to
proxy for the elasticity of taxable business income. Rows III display the marginal cost estimates when the median current-tax
rate wage-bill elasticity from Player (2011) is used as the proxy. The current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity is the best available
estimate for the elasticity of owner-effort. Therefore, it can serve as a lower-bound for the marginal cost of taxation if the only
cost were due to reduced owner-effort. Rows IV and V use the estimates for overall taxable income elasticity from Feldstein
(1995). Hence the per employer tax in Rows IV and V is computed using the same data on Schedule C employers but the
elasticity estimate for overall income. Feldstein's net-of-tax-rate elasticities are first converted to tax-elasticities for a proper
comparison. All estimates are for employers facing statutory tax changes in the respective base year. The marginal burden of
taxation is reported per employer (or per firm employing labor) in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for the base-year
sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy in the base year. 
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Table 2.6  
The Instantaneous Welfare Cost of Displaced Labor from the Small Business Sector  
 
1992 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy
Mean Wage Bill Elasticity -0.47 -0.27
Short-run Welfare Cost $68 $796,822 $7,968,222 $47 $280,735 $2,807,353
Median Wage Bill Elasticity -0.60 -0.31
Short-run Welfare Cost $87 $1,017,220 $10,172,198 $54 $322,326 $3,223,257
Observations 11,644 6,016
Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
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Table 2.7 
Summary of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation on Small Business Employers:  
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income & Displaced Labor 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
     Marginal Welfare Cost Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy Per Employer Sample U.S. Economy
1.    Elasticity of Taxable Business Income 
High Estimate: $12,961 $150,917,514 $1,509,175,141 $5,567 $33,489,665 $334,896,648
Low Estimate: $7,907 $92,065,786 $920,657,856 $4,065 $24,452,476 $244,524,762
2.    Instantaneous Cost of Displaced  Labor
High Estimate: $87 $1,017,220 $10,172,198 $54 322,326 $3,223,257
Low Estimate: $68 $796,822 $7,968,222 $47 280,735 $2,807,353
Observations: 11,644 6,016
Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
1993 Tax Reforms 2001-2003 Tax Reforms
Table 7 summarizes the main estimates of the paper. The high and low estimates for the elasticity of taxable business income come from Table 4 which uses the elasticity of taxable
business income estimates from the 1992 and 2000 data on employers facing income taxrate changes. The instantaneous cost of displaced labor comes from Table 6 where the mean and
median wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player (2011) are utilized to estimate the impact on labor when small business owners alter the scale of the firm's operations. The high estimates
are from the median wage-bill elasticity and the low estimates are from the mean wage-bill elasticity. The data are a 10% stratified random sample; therefore, the cost borne by the
economy is simply ten times the cost borne in the sample. 
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Figure 2.1 - Historical Tax Brackets and Tax Rates 
1988-1990*
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over
15.0% $0 $29,750 15.0% $0 $34,000 15.0% $0 $36,900
28.0% $29,750 $71,900 28.0% $34,000 $82,150 28.0% $36,900 $89,150
33.0% $71,900 $149,250 31.0% $82,150 - 31.0% $89,150 $140,000
28.0% $149,250 - 36.0% $140,000 $250,000
39.6% $250,000 -
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over
15.0% $0 $45,200 10.0% $0 $12,000 10.0% $0 $14,000
27.5% $45,200 $109,250 15.0% $12,000 $46,700 15.0% $14,000 $56,800
30.5% $109,250 $166,500 27.0% $46,700 $112,850 25.0% $56,800 $114,650
35.5% $166,500 $297,350 30.0% $112,850 $171,950 28.0% $114,650 $174,700
39.1% $297,350 - 35.0% $171,950 $307,050 33.0% $174,700 $311,950
38.6% $307,050 - 35.0% $311,950 -
*Income ranges are listed for the first year and are adjusted for inflation in consecutive years.
Income BracketsIncome Brackets
Income Brackets
1991-1992* 1993-2000*
2003-2005*2002
Income Brackets
2001
Personal Income Tax Brackets 1988-2005 for Married filing Jointly
Income Brackets
Income Brackets
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Anticipated Tax Brackets and Tax Rates 2001-2010 
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over Tax Rate Over But Not Over
0.0% $0 $26,350 10.0% $0 $12,000 10.0% $0 $14,300 10.0% $0 $14,000
15.0% $26,350 $63,550 15.0% $12,000 $46,700 15.0% $14,300 $58,100 15.0% $14,000 $56,800
28.0% $63,550 $132,600 27.0% $46,700 $112,850 26.0% $58,100 $117,250 25.0% $56,800 $114,650
31.0% $132,600 $208,350 30.0% $112,850 $171,950 29.0% $117,250 $178,650 28.0% $114,650 $174,700
36.0% $208,350 $288,351 35.0% $171,950 $307,050 34.0% $178,650 $319,100 33.0% $174,700 $311,950
39.6% $288,351 - 38.6% $307,050 - 37.6% $319,100 - 35.0% $311,950 -
*Income ranges are listed for the first year only.
Tax Rates 2006-2010
Income Brackets
Proposed Changes in Tax Rates 2001-2010 (under EGTRRA 2001) for Married Filing Jointly 
Tax Rate prior to July 1, 2001 Tax Rate July 1, 2001 -2003 Tax Rates 2004-2005
Income Brackets Income Brackets Income Brackets
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Figure 2.3 –Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 1992-1994 
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Figure 2.4 –Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 2001-2004 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE VALUE OF RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL 
REVIEW 
 
1 Introduction 
The trend towards residential communities with privately provided amenities and 
services began after World War II and has continued over the past two decades. 
Residential community associations (RCAs) include homeowners‟ associations, 
condominium associations and cooperative associations.  RCAs finance projects through 
neighborhood fees that supplement or replace local government goods, services and 
governance. Despite the rising popularity of RCAs, the associations tend to receive 
negative media attention and have been scrutinized for exerting their rights to issue 
punishment fees and place liens on member properties.
112
  
The high level of scrutiny is seemingly at odds with the fact that individuals in 
RCAs originally chose to live there and signed all of the governing documents prior to 
becoming residents. The existing RCA literature focuses on RCA efficiency, which may 
have implications to guide court judgments. Theoretically, RCAs provide and price goods 
and services that residents value when property buyers are fully aware of the effect RCA 
affiliation has on property value. Differently sized RCAs could lend insight into how 
agency costs change with the number of residents. RCAs with different voting systems 
and by-laws could provide cross-sectional evidence of the value-added through lenient or 
strict governance. 
                                               
112 For examples, search the Internet for “HOA scrutinized”. In one example, a Texas HOA issued a fee to 
an ex-military member flying the American flag. The state of Texas changed the legal scope of HOAs in 
response to the case in late 2011 (Hiller 2012). 
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I examine the sales prices of single-family houses for three Spartanburg County 
RCAs and the sales prices for the RCAs‟ most comparable non-RCA neighborhoods. The 
comparison of non-RCA data and RCA data allows me to examine the relative average 
value of a RCA. RCAs appear to increase property values by 2.2% in my sample. I then 
examine one neighborhood with 120 houses that has a mandatory homeowners‟ 
association for 30 lakefront properties. Homes in this particular RCA sell at a 3.8% 
premium to the other homes in the neighborhood. This is the capitalized net benefit of 
living on, and accessing the lake. 
I also review and critique the existing empirical literature on RCA efficiency and 
discuss the theoretical hurdles of applied research in the area.
113
 I show that the existing 
literature is downwardly biased because it omits a variable for the age of the property. 
“Age” is an important variable to include because it proxies for many other determinants 
of property value that are difficult to explicitly quantify. For example, the variable “age” 
can proxy for location, architectural-style and quality, and projected maintenance costs. 
A brief history of RCAs is presented in Section 2. Section 3 outlines RCA theory 
and Section 4 discusses many of the problems with the existing empirical research. 
Section 5 presents the empirical specification and the data are discussed in Section 6. I 
discuss my findings in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes.  
 
 
                                               
113 Langbein et al. (2004) and Agan and Taborrak (2005) are the only empirical papers on the efficiency of 
RCAs, to my knowledge, at this time. In Appendix A, I revisit the Langbein et al. (2004) data, and include 
a variable for condominium age. The inclusion of “condo age” erases all results of inefficiency reported by 
the original study. 
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2 RCA Background  
Residential Community Associations began after World War II and gained 
popularity in the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s.
114
 Real estate developers recognized 
the demand for inexpensive housing not available in cities. Suburbs with RCAs began to 
develop, offering more and more amenities to entice people to leave the city and reside in 
the “all-inclusive” neighborhoods.  
A RCA provides a small segment of a city's total population with "public goods". 
In a homeowners' association, public goods may include community rules and activities, 
common area maintenance and landscaping, swimming pools, putting greens, and local 
lobbying services. RCAs often perform some “local government” duties like snow 
removal, sewage disposal and trash pick-up. Many of the first RCAs were essentially 
live-in country clubs or retirement neighborhoods. RCA affiliation was the province of 
affluence with the amenities to match.
115
  
In the 1980s middle-income consumer demand for traditional housing substitutes 
grew, and RCA developers responded. Nearly 100,000 RCAs were formed in the 1980s, 
offering fewer amenities and services at lower prices to attract middle-income consumers 
(Dilger 1991).
 
The distribution of RCA diversity increased tremendously from the 
original country clubs and retirement villages to a wide range of service bundles. Dilger 
(1992) notes that by the end of the 1980s, “Residential community associations…ranged 
in size and responsibilities from a few homes on a single street that collectively provide 
                                               
114 See Dilger (1991) and Dilger (1992) for a full discussion. 
115
 See Dilger (1991) and Dilger (1992) for a full discussion. 
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only one or two services to thousands of homes comprising a mid-size city such as 
Reston, Virginia, that offers dozens of services.”   
Over the past 15 years, the number and power of RCAs has grown. In 2008 there 
were over 300,000 registered RCAs in the United States.
116
 In 2001, 50 million people in 
the U.S. belonged to at least one of these small quasi-governmental organizations.
117
  
RCAs are presumably a way to increase the utility derived from, and therefore, 
the value of a property.  RCAs operate under a set of “club-like” conditions with their 
own by-laws and governance. RCAs have the legal power to place liens on residential 
properties and foreclose on residents when the RCA by-laws are broken. These legal 
powers help negate potential free-rider problems. A purchaser buying into a RCA wants 
the association to be able to collect delinquent payments and fees so the unpaid portions 
will not be shifted to the other fee-paying property owners.  
A residential developer typically sets the scope of the RCA and the amenities it 
offers. Because the developer initiates the RCA, he retains some, if not majority, voting 
rights until about half of the property units are sold to individual owners or investors.  
Initial research on RCAs was purely theoretical. In separate books, Tullock 
(1970) and Foldvary (1994) argue that RCAs and other small local voluntary 
organizations are presumably efficient. Foldvary (1994) performs three case studies of 
decentralized local government activity in the United States.
118
 Alternatively, Helsley and 
                                               
116 Source: Community Associations Institute (CAI), http://www.caionline.org/Pages/Default.aspx 
117 Individuals owning multiple properties could be members of several different associations. Source: 
Community Associations Institute (CAI), http://www.caionline.org/Pages/Default.aspx 
 
118 One of the cases is a condominium association in Alexandria, Virginia which is similar in location to the 
associations studied by Langbein et al. (2004). 
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Strange (1998) apply political and special-interest group theories to the theory of RCAs. 
This is particularly due to the use of rent-seeking by board members. However, they do 
not attempt to evaluate the relative efficiency of RCAs: RCAs may be inefficient 
compared to a welfare maximizing equilibrium while being relatively more efficient than 
an existing benchmark like the local government.  
Dilger (1992) reviews RCAs in practice and their relationship with local 
governments on issues like taxation, financing, and governance. On taxation, the issue of 
the double-taxation of benefits arises: residents pay RCA fees and property taxes. Some 
local governments rebate a portion of the property tax to account for the privately 
provided services (trash/snow removal).
119
 With respect to financing, Dilger (1992) 
argues that if RCAs increase property values, local government tax revenues are 
augmented because most property taxes are based on fair-market valuations. In this case, 
RCAs subsidize activities that the local government would typically provide. Thus, the 
local government may have a vested interest in the success of local RCAs.  
Foldvary (1994) writes that the privatization of local government services by 
RCAs is due to “unregulated private policy-making” and that “private communities unite 
governance with market competition in the provision of public goods.” RCAs are a 
product of Tiebout sorting and occur from the bottom-up, in contrast to the top-down 
approach typically undertaken by larger government bodies. Local governments may be 
forced to become more efficient to compete with private RCAs when the two forms of 
governance offer similar products and services.  
                                               
119 Additionally, even though local governments and RCAs provide similar services, property taxes are 
deductible from federal income taxes whereas RCA fees are not tax-deductible. 
103 
 
My focus in this paper is on the empirical value of RCAs for which the existing 
literature has provided only preliminary results. Langbein et al. (2004) conclude that 
RCAs are inefficient but do not produce convincing or significant results. They use 
property values (condominium sales) to test the efficiency of RCAs, measured by the 
association‟s fee level. They perform an old-fashioned hedonic pricing model without 
accounting for selection and endogeneity. Extrapolating from their results, Langbein et al. 
(2004) speculate that RCAs over-provide services or charge too much for the services 
provided. They assert that RCAs face a greater oversight and management problem than 
local governments.
120
  
The second empirical analysis on the efficiency of RCAs is by Agan and 
Tabarrok (2005). Analyzing a dataset containing observations both in and outside of 
RCAs, they compare RCA property values to properties under the local government‟s 
jurisdiction. They estimate that RCAs increase sales prices for members by 5.4% relative 
to similar houses not under an association‟s governance.  
 
3 RCA Decision-Making  
Inefficiencies pertaining to group decision-making are expected to increase with 
group size. In the absence of competition, a large collective body will be less efficient 
than a small collective group of decision-makers. The relative inefficiency of a large 
                                               
120 Langbein et al. (2004) also look at the relative efficiency of RCAs with more or less community 
involvement and more or less professional management services. They find that higher RCA fees reduce 
average property values and that professional management, as opposed to a community-run RCA board 
“mitigates the property value losses due to RCA inefficiency”. Their results appear to show that 
professional management constrains fee levels as well as the “over provision” of services. 
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RCA to a small RCA, or a RCA to a local government, should be capitalized in property 
values (sales prices). An association has two choices after collecting dues:
121
 
The RCA can spend the money on goods public to the community and valued by 
the residents.  In this case, a cost-minimizing RCA operates like a firm and property 
values (stock prices) increase relative to other neighborhoods, ceteris paribus. 
Alternatively, after collecting dues the RCA or manager can throw the collections away 
(or spend collections on services that are not valued by residents). Here, the lost funds 
will be fully capitalized in the value of the property and property values under the RCA‟s 
jurisdiction will decrease relative to other non-RCA properties.  
Of course, any outcome between the two extremes is also possible. In the first 
scenario, buyers are only willing to pay a premium for a property when the RCA is more 
attractive than competitor RCAs (or local governments). The relative value of goods 
provided is what determines the premium. In the second scenario, even if all RCAs 
wasted the dues, all property values would still be observed to decrease by the entire 
capitalized value of the dues, and there would be no difference in values across the 
different RCAs. 
3a RCAs vs. Local Government Property Values 
Assume two identical properties receiving one identical service: perfectly 
homogenous trash removal. Trash removal can be paid for by city taxes or by RCA fees, 
depending on the jurisdiction. This enables the researcher to examine property values 
                                               
121 This decision-making process is virtually identical to a local government that collects property taxes. 
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between the local government and RCA because the only difference between the 
properties is the jurisdiction in which each exists.  
With identical properties, location and services, any differences in property values 
will be solely due to differences in the costs of serving (the taxes or RCA fees paid). The 
difference in yearly taxes and yearly RCA fees will be fully capitalized in the present 
valuation of a given property. If the property paying local government taxes is valued 
more highly than the RCA property then the local yearly property taxes are lower than 
the yearly RCA fees. The relative inefficiency is captured in market values. The reverse 
is true when the RCA property is worth more than the local government property. 
Theoretically, the value of a residential property, whether under the local 
government or an RCA, or both, will be a function of square footage, the number of 
bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, lot size, taxes, RCA fees, a dummy variable for the 
presence of an RCA, property age, the location, and potentially the number of other 
properties under the same local service provider (a measure of dwelling supply).
122
 Taxes 
or RCA fees could be replaced with the number of services provided, the quality of 
services, delivery or administrative efficiency, and the number of houses in the RCA. 
This comes from the mathematical identity that Total Revenue must equal Total 
Expenses.   
                                               
122 The number of units can also represent economies of scale in the provision of services. An RCA has to 
reach some critical mass at which point it becomes less costly for the RCA to provide the service instead of 
individuals or the local government. 
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RCA fees and local government taxes are both functions of the quality and 
number of services provided and administrative efficiencies and the number of properties 
in the jurisdiction. When quality goes up, total spending on services increases.  
Taxes or fees increase with increases in the number and quality of services 
provided. Taxes or fees decrease with additional units up to the point of minimum 
average cost and increases in administrative efficiency. When quality is increased, 
holding taxes or fees constant, property values increase; furthermore, if administrative 
efficiency is increased, ceteris paribus, property values increase.  
When the number of services and quality are allowed to vary between the two 
identical properties, the resulting capitalization becomes much more ambiguous. 
Returning to the trash removal example, with different qualities between the RCA and the 
local government, higher quality will increase property values while lower administrative 
efficiency reduces property values.
123
 The source of capitalization cannot be addressed 
unless either quality or administrative efficiency is completely identified. 
Given identical taxes and RCA fees, when RCAs have lower administrative 
efficiencies compared with the local government but also have higher quality services, 
the property values could be identical for two very different products, or the values may 
differ but without proper controls we will not be able to separately identify the two 
effects.  
 
 
                                               
123 Quality can refer to the number of pick-up days per month, the distance between the house and the pick-
up location, etc. 
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4 Problems with Empirical Research on RCA Efficiency 
The empirical and theoretical problems for researchers empirically analyzing the 
efficiency of RCAs include: identifying a comparable benchmark, local government 
competition and joint decision-making, the number and quality of amenities provided, 
and RCA and local government overlap. 
 The empirical researcher must be wary about the baseline chosen for purposes of 
comparison. For instance, if all RCAs or local governments spend and tax with the same 
level of efficiency, the tax will be fully capitalized in all real estate prices and no 
comparative differential will be found. However, if RCAs are relatively less efficient than 
local governments, only RCA properties will reflect the capitalized RCA fees (taxes). 
When RCAs are relatively more efficient than local governments, RCA property values 
should be higher than non-RCA properties. Empirical work with the Tiebout model 
shows that in the case of inefficient taxation and spending, the lost value should be fully 
capitalized in residential real estate prices (property values).  
Econometrically, the comparison group is vital to the model. Interpreting the 
resulting coefficients will depend on the relevant baseline group. Detailed knowledge of 
the comparison group‟s characteristics will be necessary for proper interpretation and for 
inferring policy implications. For instance, constructing a reliable benchmark is more 
difficult for condominiums than single-family homes because most condominiums have 
common areas subject to a property association.  
In theory, the more RCAs in a given area, the more successful Tiebout sorting 
will be, thanks to a wider range of choices over preferred services and amenity bundles. 
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With greater imperfections in selection, the greater the discount buyers must receive to 
“buy in” to a sub-optimal RCA or local government.  
Furthermore, the comparison group, the local government, coexists with RCAs. 
Researchers cannot observe local government decisions and efficiency levels in the 
absence of RCAs. Local governments probably improve efficiency when faced with 
competition from local RCAs. Local government behavior with RCA competition is very 
different from that without RCA competition. This complicates determining the relative 
efficiency of RCAs because the presence of an RCA can signal a “bad” local 
government. In this case, the existence of an RCA is endogenous.  
Local governments also compete with other local governments. Therefore, even 
when a local government does not compete directly with an RCA, it competes indirectly 
by competing with other local governments that do contain RCAs. 
The researcher must be careful in both cases to control for services or amenities 
offered by both the RCA and the local government. Some of the difference in property 
values could be due to differences in amenities rather than differing administrative 
efficiency. It may be the case that RCAs offer amenities and services that local 
governments cannot. In these cases, the difference in valuation could be due to different 
amenities or different management efficiencies. One example may be the restrictions 
RCAs place on the aesthetic appearance of properties. Analyzing efficiency is 
complicated further when local governments offer different services than RCAs.  
The quality of amenities across RCAs and local governments varies. When RCA 
quality is better than local government quality, people are willing to pay a premium for 
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RCA amenities. Alternatively, when the price of the service is the same for local 
governments and RCAs but there is some difference in the channel of distribution that 
affects the quality (customer service, timeliness, less bureaucratic red-tape), any 
valuation premium will be observed as higher property values.  
Furthermore, many RCAs perform the duties of the local government, which 
means some of the services and fees paid may overlap with local taxes and services. To 
mitigate the potential for double-taxation, some RCA properties may not have to pay 
100% of local government taxes because of the services provided by the RCA. Local tax 
rebates to the RCA for sewage, snow removal and trash pickup are common. The correct, 
or incorrect, pricing of these services layers another level of complexity and will at best 
require simplifying assumptions. 
4b Problems with Existing Empirical Research 
Ideally, any model examining the efficiency of RCAs would test whether the 
presence of an RCA raises or lowers property values (sales prices) relative to not having 
the RCA. Langbein et al. (2004) examine the effect of RCA fees on sales prices. Holding 
RCA fees constant, the authors find that RCAs providing more services and amenities 
have lower sales prices.  
First, Langbein et al. (2004) use subjective board rankings of community 
involvement (2001) to measure RCA citizen oversight. Theoretically, RCAs with more 
active members will demand higher efficiency from management, so the management 
will shirk relatively less than an RCA with inactive members. The Langbein et al. (2004) 
community-involvement rankings do not include controls for the frequency of RCA 
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services or quality, or how the RCA has changed over the past three years. Each board of 
directors self-reports the survey data and it is not an objective or relative measurement for 
community involvement.  
Not only do RCAs compete with the local government for fee-paying residents, 
they also compete among themselves. Any given consumer can decide to live under the 
local government‟s jurisdiction or can choose from a multitude of RCAs offering various 
amenities and fee-structures. The number and quality of amenities offered can change 
over time and is probably influenced by the age and location of the RCA, competition 
from other RCAs, and consumer demand. Without evidence to support a constant time-
trend, the Langbein et al. (2004) results would be biased and inconsistent.  
  Second, the Langbein et al. (2004) empirical specification only includes RCA 
fees, whether the developer or professional manager manages the property, a measure of 
“community involvement”, the number of services offered, the square-footage of the unit, 
the number of units in the property, and the 1999 assessed property value.  
The authors fail to include a crucial variable: the age of the condominium at the 
time of sale. This omitted variable will bias the result downward and could represent 
some reverse causality. High RCA fees may lead to relatively lower property values, but 
lower property values, especially due to the property‟s age, will induce higher RCA fees. 
Older properties have higher RCA fees because future maintenance costs exceed the costs 
required to maintain newer properties. Some of this expected maintenance cost will be 
reflected in the individual unit‟s value but the costs of age will also be reflected in the 
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projected costs of maintaining the common areas, which will then be capitalized in 
property values relative to other condominiums.  
Although the authors control for the base-year assessments, I do not think this 
adequately accounts for differently aged properties. An older property may not increase 
in value as quickly as a newer property or it may decrease in value more quickly. A linear 
relationship between age and property value is probably incorrect. As shown in Appendix 
A, including a variable for age reverses the Langbein et al. (2004) findings. Age can 
proxy for location, architectural-style and structural quality, crime rates, and expected 
maintenance.
124
 RCA fees are based on projected maintenance fees, as well as the goods 
and services provided. If two properties are identical in every regard except age, the older 
property will have higher RCA fees, and hence lower property values, when those fees 
are capitalized into sales prices. 
Furthermore, Langbein et al. (2004) assert that RCA's depress property values 
relative to the socially optimum level; however, a more pertinent benchmark would be 
the expected value of the property in the absence of an RCA. To reliably measure RCA 
efficiency, one needs a benchmark for the alternative state of the world. The researcher 
would like to know what property values are in the absence of the RCA, or before the 
RCA was instituted.  
 
 
 
                                               
124 Age can also proxy for the local government policies and services during a time period. This could make 
the formation of an RCA more or less likely in some years over others. 
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5 Empirical Specification 
I would like to compare properties in RCAs to similar properties not in RCAs to 
estimate the value consumers place on RCA affiliation. In most of my analysis, I will not 
be able to identify the different sources of value (for example, aesthetic restrictions or 
amenities provided). I estimate the following regression: 
        (1) 
Where ln(Si) is the 2002-2005 sales price of property i in logarithmic form and 
RCA is a dummy variable that is equal to 0 when property i is not in an HOA and 1 when 
it is in an RCA. The X-vector includes variables for square footage, acreage, the number 
of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, and whether or not there is a garage and the 
number of cars it can accommodate. I also include a variable for the age of the property at 
the date of sale, age-squared, and year and subdivision fixed-effects in some 
specifications.  
Age is an important variable because it proxies for many different aspects of 
property value. The age of a property can reflect the depreciation in value due to nature‟s 
wear and tear, time, and technological innovations.
125
 Age can proxy for the premium 
often placed on period-specific architecture, design and superior craftsmanship. Age can 
also proxy for the distance from the city center and the likeliness of being in a RCA.
126
 
RCAs are more likely to occur in the suburbs which tend to be outside of the city-center 
                                               
125 Asbestos and lead-paint are not used in newer homes. Larger-diameter water pipes and higher-voltage 
wiring are required by building-codes in more recent years.  
126 Cities typically develop from the inside and sprawl outwards. The oldest homes are typically in the 
center of the city. 
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and relatively younger. To the extent age proxies for location, it may also proxy for the 
ethnicity and diversity of the residential area.
127
  
Year fixed-effects allow me to isolate the aspects of sale prices not associated 
with yearly housing-price growth and other macroeconomic factors. Subdivision fixed-
effects allow for me to control for all of the differences between neighborhoods. In real 
estate, the largest difference between such similar neighborhoods is usually location.
128
 
 
6 Data 
 My data comes from the Spartanburg County MLS dataset from 2002-2005. It 
includes sales prices and other housing characteristics for three Spartanburg County 
homeowners‟ associations and the non-HOA neighborhoods that are most similar. The 
non-HOA neighborhoods were chosen based on their similarity to the HOAs in terms of 
location, lot size, age, atmosphere and real estate comparables. The selections are 
subjective but take into account which neighborhoods potential buyers view as 
comparable.
129
 All of the properties are in the same school district and the data includes 
information on the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, heated square-footage, 
acreage, garages, the closing date of the sale, and the age of the property at closing.  
 The data include information on five neighborhoods: Arbours, Williamsburg East, 
Oak Creek, Converse Heights and Andrews Farm. Converse Heights and Andrews Farms 
do not have residential community associations. The Arbours community is one of the 
                                               
127 This is particularly true if different ethnicities settled in certain areas within a small window of time. 
128 “Location, location, location,” is the mantra of most realtors. 
129 As determined and advised by Spartanburg realtors and HOA board members. Driving through each 
neighborhood and HOA, one gets a feel for the level of comparability.  
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larger community associations in Spartanburg with over 65 homes. The RCA offers a 
community pool, tennis courts, walking trails, playground, trash pick-up, front-lawn 
maintenance, community lighting and common-area maintenance. Their RCA fees are 
between $60-70 per month. 
 Williamsburg East is another prominent Spartanburg RCA that includes about 35 
houses and has by-laws governing lawns, house-siding and other aesthetics. The Oak 
Creek neighborhood has a “mandatory HOA” for lake-front properties. The mandatory 
association provides and maintains the lake for approximately 30 lakefront property-
owners. “Mandatory HOA” fees of approximately $450 per year maintain the lake and 
keep it stocked with fish. Lakefront property owners are the only neighborhood residents 
with access to the lake and fishing. All of the neighborhoods with and without RCAs are 
in the same school district. 
 Table 3.1 summarizes sales prices for homes inside and outside of RCAs. Sales 
prices are higher for non-RCA properties in the raw data. The mean non-RCA sales price 
is $221,566 and the mean RCA sales price is $153,216. RCA properties have a lower 
range and tighter variance than their non-RCA counterparts.  
 Selected summary statistics for properties not in RCAs are included in Table 3.2a 
and statistics for RCA properties are shown in Table 3.2b. RCA and non-RCA properties 
appear to be very similar in terms of the number of bedrooms, bathrooms and acreage. 
Non-RCAs properties tend to be larger on average than RCA homes (2,525 heated 
square-feet instead of 1,875 square-feet in RCA properties). In this sample, non-RCA 
properties also tend to be much older on average than RCA properties. At the time of 
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closing, the mean non-RCA property is 58 years whereas the mean RCA property is 16.2 
years.  
 
7a Empirical Findings 
The estimates from the dataset on selected Spartanburg County subdivisions are 
displayed in Table 3.3. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates when age and age-squared 
are included and excluded. Column 3 includes variables for age and age-squared as well 
as year fixed-effects. Column 4 includes both year fixed-effects and subdivision fixed-
effects. RCA affiliation appears to have a positive impact on sales prices in Column 4 and 
is estimated to increase sales prices by 2.2%. The average non-RCA sales price for the 
dataset is $221,566; therefore, RCA affiliation is estimated to increase the value of the 
property by $4,874 on average. 
Although the estimates for age and age-squared are not individually significant, 
the overall specification is significant. The specification with age and age-squared 
outperforms the specification without the two variables in an F-test; it also outperforms 
the specification with each variable individually.
130
 
The sign on age changes from positive to negative across specifications. This 
provides insight into how age may proxy for different property characteristics in different 
empirical specifications. In Column 4 subdivision is held constant. In this case, age is not 
allowed to proxy for neighborhood and location. Furthermore, age is more likely to proxy 
                                               
130 Including both age and age-squared outperforms the specification including only age, and the 
specification including only age-squared. 
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for physical deterioration instead of different architectural-schemes that could be 
neighborhood-specific. 
Depending on how consumers value different types of space, the value of a home 
could decrease with additional bedrooms when square-footage is held constant because a 
larger fraction of living space is devoted to bedrooms.
131
 Increasing the square-footage of 
a property by 1,000 square-feet increases the sales price by approximately 35%.  
As shown in columns 1 through 4, acreage seems to act as a proxy for 
subdivision.
132
 Acreage could continue to proxy for other excluded variables, particularly 
the distance from the city-center, after subdivision fixed-effects are included which could 
be the reason for the negative coefficient.  
7b Arbours Community Association  
 Table 3.4 displays the results of the analysis for the Arbours community 
association. The Arbours neighborhood was built and established in 1993 and is most 
comparable to the Converse Heights neighborhood which is not affiliated with a RCA. 
Converse Heights is an older neighborhood with a mix of both old and new homes but the 
two have identical school systems, are close in proximity to one another and have similar 
community atmospheres. The Arbours RCA serves 65 single-family houses and the 
Converse Heights neighborhood includes about 1,200 houses. 
The Arbours community association appears to increase property values by 1.7% 
relative to similarly situated properties in Converse Heights. Increasing the square-
                                               
131 This means less square-footage can be allocated to kitchens, bathrooms and living areas. Recall that 
square-footage is “heated square-footage”. 
132 I use the terms subdivision and neighborhood interchangeably. 
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footage of a property by 100 heated square-feet increases the sales price by 
approximately 10.5%. The sample size is relatively small and includes only 19 
observations in the Arbours RCA which may explain the negative coefficients for 
bedrooms and acreage. Furthermore, lot-sizes in Converse Heights are typically much 
smaller than the Arbours neighborhood. Without subdivision fixed-effects, I believe 
acreage is serving as a proxy for neighborhood and location. As displayed in Table 3.4, if 
acreage were to double (increase by 100%) then the sales price is expected to decrease by 
33%. The variables for age and age-squared are particularly important when comparing 
newer houses and neighborhoods to older houses and neighborhoods.    
7c Case-Study: Oak Creek 
 The data on the Oak Creek subdivision provide a nice case-study on the pricing of 
a single good. Oak Creek is a neighborhood that has a “voluntary HOA” for all properties 
and a “mandatory HOA” for about 30 properties on the lake. The “voluntary HOA” 
maintains the entrance to the neighborhood and about 90% of the 120 properties 
voluntarily contribute the requested $100 per year. The mandatory HOA fees are paid by 
owners with lakefront properties. These property-owners are the only neighborhood 
residents with access to the lake and fishing.
133
 Their fees of approximately $450 per year 
maintain the lake and keep it stocked with fish.
134
 
 Table 3.5 shows the results using Oak Creek sales prices for homes both in and 
out of the “mandatory HOA”.135 Only lakefront property owners are required to pay 
                                               
133 Access is patrolled around the lake and anyone without a proper permit can be cited for trespassing. 
134 Lake maintenance includes the plumbing and drainage for the lake and dredging the lake when 
necessary. 
135 I am essentially evaluating the net premium of lakefront living for this lake. 
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yearly dues to maintain the lake. The increase in property value due to the RCA is the 
capitalized net benefit that property-owners attribute to living on the lake. The value of 
lakefront property and lake-access is approximately 3.8% higher than non-lakefront 
property. For the sample, the mean non-lakefront sales price is $175,000 which equates to 
a capitalized increase in lakefront property values of $6650.
136
  
The sample-size is small and includes only 19 observations, 5 of which are 
lakefront sales. Notice that within a neighborhood, acreage is positive but because of the 
small sample size, very few coefficients are statistically significant. Increasing the 
square-footage of an Oak Creek property by 1,000 square-feet increases the sales price by 
approximately 57%.  
 
8 Conclusion 
I estimate the average increase in property values from RCA affiliation to be 2.2% 
in three prominent Spartanburg RCAs. This RCA premium ranges from 1.7% for the 
largest RCA to 3.8% for the smallest RCA that applies only to lakefront property-owners 
in Oak Creek. These estimates are similar to the findings of Agan and Tabarrok (2005) 
that estimate RCA affiliation increases property values by 5.4% in Alexandria, 
Virginia.
137
 Some of the existing literature suffers from a downward omitted variable bias 
because it excludes the age of the property at the time of sale. A variable for age is 
                                               
136 This equates to an average perceived total yearly benefit of $650 and a net yearly benefit of $200 ($650 
less $450 fees) when the interest rate is fixed at 3% indefinitely. 
137 My estimates include year fixed-effects and the Agan and Tabarrok (2005) estimates include “age” but 
do not include year fixed-effects and they do not report the implications of including year fixed-effects.  
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important because it serves as a proxy for other less measurable determinants of property 
value. 
I also discuss the theoretical and econometric challenges of empirically analyzing 
RCAs. When RCAs and local governments coexist, they compete with each other for fee-
paying residents. Hence, the sheer existence of an RCA could induce a local government 
to become more efficient because it is no longer a monopoly provider of services.  
Perhaps RCAs are simply the country clubs of the middle-class. RCAs provide 
the means for middle-income citizens to purchase a bundle of amenities not possible at 
the individual level. Such “luxury” goods in the club-like atmosphere provide gyms, 
pools, putting greens – goods that are desirable for middle-income Americans but 
financially difficult to purchase individually. Maintaining and purchasing a pool or 
putting green is very costly individually but not as much in aggregate.  
Theoretically, one would expect efficiency to increase with smaller groups of 
collective decision-making. Future research could focus on the decision-making 
efficiency of relatively small governing bodies in comparison to a local government 
benchmark in the presence of dynamic competition between the two authorities.  It may 
be interesting to compare the strictness of voting rules and by-laws across RCAs to see if 
more powerful RCA by-laws lead to higher property values than less stringent RCAs. 
Future research may want to focus on RCAs as a form of “property value” 
insurance or warranty. From the extended warranty and "Dutch Book" literature, 
economists observe that some people are willing to pay for “peace of mind” and “one-
stop shopping convenience” in the insurance and warranties markets. A property owner 
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cannot control who moves in beside him but an RCA can legally prohibit the new 
occupant from doing anything that radiates negative externalities. In this case, fees are 
paid each month to insure against losses in property value based on the maintenance of 
other homes in the area and common areas. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary Sales Prices 
 
Sales Price Mean Median Minimum Maximum Observations
Non-RCA $221,566 $192,450 $69,900 $553,000 94
(Std Deviation) (105,057)
RCA $153,216 $132,250 $82,500 $410,000 32
(Std Deviation) (62,861)
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Table 3.2a 
Non-RCA Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Sales Price $221,566 $192,450 $69,900 $553,000
(Std. Deviation) (105,057)
Bedrooms 3.5 3.0 2.0 6.0
(Std. Deviation) (0.80)
Bathrooms 2.5 2.5 1.0 5.5
(Std. Deviation) (0.88)
Square-footage 2,525 2,487 763 5,748
(Std. Deviation) (937)
Acres 0.19 0.0 0.0 2.30
(Std. Deviation) (0.40)
Age 58 64 11 105
(Std. Deviation) (25)
Observations 94
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Table 3.2b 
RCA Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Sales Price $153,216 $132,250 $82,500 $410,000
(Std. Deviation) (62,861)
Bedrooms 3.0 3.0 2.0 4.0
(Std. Deviation) (0.78)
Bathrooms 2.4 2.25 2.0 4.5
(Std. Deviation) (0.55)
Square-footage 1,875 1,685 1,050 4,125
(Std. Deviation) (642)
Acres 0.21 0.0 0.0 3.1
(Std. Deviation) (0.55)
Age 16.2 15.5 8.0 24
(Std. Deviation) (4.55)
Observations 32
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Table 3.3 
The Value of RCAs: Select Spartanburg County Subdivisions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age & Age, Year FE
Age Age Year & Subdivision
Variable Omitted Included Fixed-Effects Fixed-Effects
RCA Affiliation -0.66 0.34 0.37 2.20***
(Std. Deviation) (0.44) (0.64) (0.64) (0.81)
Bedrooms -3.33 -2.10 -4.96 -2.89
(Std. Deviation) (30.90) (30.49) (30.97) (32.90)
Bathrooms 7.45* 8.70** 8.59** 10.59***
(Std. Deviation) (3.89) (3.88) (3.92) (3.80)
Square-footage 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.35***
(Std. Deviation) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Acres -67.31 -62.86 -63.23 -5.11
(Std. Deviation) (42.10) (41.61) (43.00) (49.47)
Age - 3.72 3.82 -1.31
(Std. Deviation) (3.66) (3.73) (5.00)
Age-Squared - -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(Std. Deviation) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Constant 11.05*** 10.87*** 10.86*** 10.67***
(Std. Deviation) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
     Observations 126 126 126 126
     Adjusted R^2 0.823 0.829 0.826 0.842
Note: All standard errors are clustered by subdivision. Significance at 0.01% is denoted by ***,
5% is denoted by ** and 10% is denoted by *.
Table 3 displays the results of the analysis for all selected neighborhood properties in
Spartanburg County. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates when age and age-squared are
included and excluded. Column 3 includes variables for age and age-squared as well as year fixed-
effects. Column 4 includes both year fixed-effects and subdivision fixed-effects. RCA affiliation
appears to have a positive impact on sales prices in Column 4. In Column 4, if acreage is doubled,
sales prices decrease by 5.11%. Depending on how consumers value different types of space, the
value of a home could decrease with additional bedrooms when square-footage is held constant
because a larger fraction of living space is devoted to bedrooms. Increasing the square-footage of
a property by 1000 square-feet increases the sales price by approximately 35%. A variable for
garage is included in each specification.
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Table 3.4 
The Value of RCAs: Arbours Community Association  
(1) (2) (3)
Age &
Age Age Year
Variable Omitted Included Fixed-Effects
RCA Affiliation 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.70***
(Std. Deviation) (0.10) (0.26) (0.52)
Bedrooms -3.21*** -3.44*** -3.24***
(Std. Deviation) (0.23) (0.23) (0.47)
Bathrooms 1.88*** 1.93*** 1.93***
(Std. Deviation) (0.39) (0.49) (0.36)
Square-footage  1.05***  1.06***  1.04***
(Std. Deviation) 0.02 (0.03) (0.02)
Acres -74.85*** -69.95*** -33.82***
(Std. Deviation) (11.65) (5.44) (17.99)
Age - 10.00*** 11.14***
(Std. Deviation) (1.62) (2.95)
Age-Squared - -0.06*** -0.07***
(Std. Deviation) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant 4.29*** 3.80*** 3.90***
(Std. Deviation) (0.15) (0.16) (0.09)
     Observations 86 86 86
     R^2 0.872 0.877 0.880
Table 4 displays the results of the analysis for the Arbours community
association. The Arbours subdivision is most comparable to the Converse
Heights neighborhood which is not affiliated with a RCA. The Arbours
community association appears to increase property values relative to
similarly situated properties in Converse Heights. Increasing the square-
footage of a property by 100 square-feet increases the sales price by
approximately 10.5%. The sample size is relatively small and includes only 19
observations in the Arbours RCA which may explain the negative coefficients
for bedrooms and acreage. As shown below, variables for age and age-
squared are particularly important when comparing newer houses and
neighborhoods (Arbours), to older houses and neighborhoods (Converse
Heights). A variable for garage is included in each specification.
Note: All standard errors are robust standard errors. Significance at 0.01% is 
denoted by ***.  
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Table 3.5 
Case Study: Oak Creek Properties  
(1) (2) (3)
Age &
Age Age Year
Variable Omitted Included Fixed-Effects
RCA Affiliation 3.50** 3.90** 3.80**
(Std. Deviation) (1.30) (1.75) (1.49)
Bedrooms 6.84 6.92 11.55*
(Std. Deviation) (4.94) (5.64) (5.27)
Bathrooms 1.04 -1.18 -2.81
(Std. Deviation) (6.80) (5.12) (6.39)
Square-footage 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.57***
(Std. Deviation) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Acres 20.87 19.63 20.11
(Std. Deviation) (12.84) (12.46) (13.13)
Age - -15.54 75.50
(Std. Deviation) (88.79) (85.06)
Age-Squared - 0.39 -2.77
(Std. Deviation) 2.50 (2.50)
Constant  10.41***  10.64*** 9.76***
(Std. Deviation) (0.23) (0.73) (0.76)
     Observations 19 19 19
     Adjusted R^2 0.940 0.9363 0.955
Table 5 displays the results of the analysis for Oak Creek Properties. The Oak
Creek neighborhood has properties both in and out of the "lakefront" RCA.
Only lakefront property owners are required to pay yearly dues of $450 to
maintain the lake. The increase in property value due to the RCA is the
capitalized net benefit that property-owners attribute to living on the lake. The
value of lakefront property and access is approximately 3.8% higher than non-
lakefront property. For the sample, 3.8% of $175,000 (for non-lakefront owners)
is $6650. The sample-size is small and includes only 19 observations, 5 of
which are lakefront sales. Notice that within a neighborhood, acreage is
positive but because of the small sample size, very few coefficients are
statistically significant. Increasing the square-footage of a property by 1000
square-feet increases the sales price by approximately 57%. A variable for
garage is included in each specification.
Note: All standard errors are robust standard errors. Significance at 0.01% is
denoted by ***, 5% is denoted by ** and 10% is denoted by *.
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Appendix A 
Replication of Langbein et al. (2004) Analysis 
Langbein et al. (2004) claim that condominium associations in the Washington 
D.C. area are inefficient and that property values decline as the number of RCA services 
increases. Theoretically, after buying in at a discount, members could increase property 
values with a simple vote that would be in every owner‟s best interest.  
I Empirical Specification 
Langbein et al. (2004) estimate the following regression: 
        (1) 
Where Vi is the 2000-2001 sales price of property i and ln(FEES) is the logarithm of 
RCA fees for property i. The X-vector includes variables for the 1999 assessed property 
value, RCA size, community involvement, vertical RCA governance, the number and 
type of RCA amenities, square footage, number of bedrooms, and number of bathrooms. 
After I replicate the Langbein et al. (2004) findings, I include a variable for each 
condominium‟s age. 
The variable for 1999 assessed property values accounts for theoretically static 
factors effecting property values like the quality of the school district and the value of the 
location among others. RCA size is measured by the number of units under the RCA‟s 
jurisdiction.  Community involvement is measured with a self-reported survey from the 
RCA‟s management regarding the level of resident involvement in community 
management ranked from “comatose = -3” to “hyperactive = +3”. Community 
involvement can also be thought of as “horizontal governance”. Vertical governance is 
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measured by the percentage of all RCA responsibilities run by outside professional hired 
by the board. This percentage is self-reported on the same survey used to measure 
community involvement. The number and type of RCA amenities are also from a self-
reported survey where each RCA checks-off whether the particular amenity is offered
138
. 
The quality and frequency of amenities is not included in this measure.  
II Data 
Langbein et al. (2004) use a small panel of 195 condominium unit sales in six 
different RCAs to estimate the impact of RCAs on property values in Alexandria, 
Virginia. The data includes two years of residential condominium sales data: 1999 tax 
assessment values and 2000-2001 property sales values for six different HOA properties 
in Alexandria. The Langbein et al. (2004) data come from Metropolitan Regional 
Information Systems, Inc. (a multiple listing service used by realtors), the City of 
Alexandria, and a questionnaire. It also includes survey data on HOA quality and 
participation, some missing observations appear but the remaining observations are 
thought to be reliable. For the analysis, I augment the Langbein et al. (2004) data with 
one variable: condominium age.
139
   
 Langbein et al. (2004) interviewed a member of the RCA‟s Board of Directors to 
obtain detailed information about the nature of each RCA.
140
 The RCAs are the only 
condominium communities in Alexandria, VA, a relatively small urban suburb of 
                                               
 
139 
The various condominium websites were used to verify each condominium‟s age.  
140 Six RCAs were interviewed for the Langbein et al. (2004)  study:  1) Watergate at Landmark Condominium Association, 2) 
Colecroft Station Condominium Association, 3) Potowmack Crossing Condominium Association, 4) Stonegate Condominium 
Association, 5) Parkfairfax Condominium Association, and 6) ParcEast Condominium Association.   
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Washington, DC with a population of 128,000. It occupies less than 16 square miles and 
is about 50 percent white, 20 percent black, and 15 percent Hispanic. Only properties 
sold in the two-year period (2000-2002) are used and actual sales price is the measure of 
property value.  
 The data provide variation over 1999 assessment values, RCA services provided, 
condominium age and sales prices. More detailed characteristics that are not included in 
the summary statistics chart include: square footage, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, 
and specific RCA amenities and services provided. The monthly RCA fees range from a 
minimum amount of $115 to a maximum at $602. The RCA fees are fairly standard 
within a condominium community, differing based on square footage, but vary across 
different condominium communities because of differences in amenities and services 
offered and condominium age.  
 A large variation in condominium age (3 to 59 years old) can have a large impact 
on HOA fees, as condominium age relates directly to maintenance and major repair work.  
Obviously, the largest impact on sales price in 2001 is the assessed value in 1999, ceteris 
paribus. The raw correlation between 2000-2001 sales price and 1999 assessed property 
value is 0.78. RCA monthly fees are positively correlated with the number of services 
offered and property value: 0.19 and 0.29, respectively. While the raw correlation 
between the ln(property value) and the ln(condo age) is 0.36.  
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Table A-1 
 Summary Statistics from Langbein et al. (2004) Table 1: Summary Statistics from Langbei  et al. (2004)
Variable Mean Minimum Value Maximum Value
Property Value 2000-2001 $138,321 $21,000 $310,000
(Std. Deviation) ($45,846)
RCA Monthly Fees $252 $115 $602
(Std. Deviation) ($106)
% Professional Management 86.15 40 100
(Std. Deviation) (25.3)
Community Involvement -0.07 -3 2
(Std. Deviation) (1.34)
Number of Services 9.38 5 10
(Std. Deviation) (1.12)
Number of Units in RCA 1059.8 110 1,684
(Std. Deviation) (705.9)
Assessed Property Value (1999) $89,116 $40,200 $202,600
(Std. Deviation) ($31,206)
Condo Age in Years at 2001 40.98 3 59
(Std. Deviation) (23.63)  
 
III Results 
I first revisit the Langbein et al. (2004) study and replicate their regression model. 
Due to multicollinearity and differences in standard error methods, I was never able to 
perfectly replicate the Langbein et al. (2004) findings; however, my replication results 
were very similar. After replicating the authors‟ method, I add a variable for 
condominium age to the regression.  
With the additional variable for condominium age, I observe the results listed in 
Table A-2. The inclusion of “condo age” reverses the findings of Langbein et al. (2004) 
and estimates that increasing RCA fees leads to a statistically insignificant increase in 
sales price. Including “condo age” absorbs all of the variation Langbein et al. (2004) were 
reporting as RCA inefficiency. As shown in Table A-2, increasing the condominium‟s 
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age by one year, decreases property values by about $500 – something beyond the control 
of anyone, let alone the RCA. From this analysis, I cannot conclude that RCAs depress 
property values. No conclusions can be drawn with regard to comparative efficiency 
without a reliable benchmark.  
Furthermore, even after including the “condo age” variable, the analysis still finds 
that property values decline with increases in services. This conflicts with economic 
intuition which would encourage RCA members to reduce services to the point where the 
marginal cost of each is equal to the marginal benefit. 
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Table A-2 
Langbein et al. (2004) Estimates vs. Variable for Condo Age 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls for Controls for Controls for Controls for Dummy Variable for 
 Management  Log(Management)  Management  Log(Management) Variables Condo Age
and Services and Log(Services) and Services
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Log RCA Fee -0.26 -0.21 -0.18 -0.13 - 0.0286
(Std. Error) (0.001)** (0.005)** (0.022)** (0.101)** (0.0797)
Log Services - - -0.52 -0.40 - -0.5070
(Std. Error) (0.002)** (0.007)** (0.1365)**
Management (Vertical/Horizontal) .0025 - 0.003 - - -0.0026
(Std. Error) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.0009)**
Log(Management (Vertical/Horizontal)) - 0.11 - 0.11 - -
(Std. Error) (0.001)** (0.001)**
Log Square Feet 0.67 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.4256
(Std. Error) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.1578)**
Log Number Units 0.140 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.12
(Std. Error) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.0022)**
Log 1999 Assessed Value 0.520 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51
(Std. Error) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Condo Age - - - - - -0.0080
(Std. Error) (0.001)**
RCA1(Parkfairfax) - - - - -0.20 -
(Std. Error) (0.001)**
RCA2(Stonegate) - - - - 0.12 -
(Std. Error) (0.263)
RCA3(ParcEast) - - - - 0.22 -
(Std. Error) (0.079)
RCA4 (Potowmack) - - - - -0.21 -
(Std. Error) (0.04)**
RCA(Colecroft) - - - - Dropped -
(Std. Error)
Constant 1.66 1.710 2.75 2.59 1.77 2.677
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.013)** (0.610)**
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195
R-squared 0.70 0.75 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.73
    *Indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 1%.
Langbein et al. (2004) Findings vs. Variable for Condo Age 
RCAs and Property Values
Alexandria, Virginia
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